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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has experienced a construction boom for new sports
arenas and stadiums.' Industry experts estimate more than seven billion
dollars will be spent on new sports facilities by the year 2006.2 Much of that
money will be paid for by local and state governments. As Roger G. Noll and
Andrew Zimbalist, two prominent economists who have extensively
researched and critiqued the public funding of new sports facilities, point
out, "[t]he average subsidy from a host city to its sports team will likely
exceed $10 million per year." 3
Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Real Connection, in SPORTS,
JOBS, & TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 494 (Roger G. Noll &
Andrew Zimbalist, eds., 1997). In the Fall of 1998, voters approved new sports facilities in Denver and
San Diego. Peggy Lowe &Julia Martinez, Broncos Win on a Tuesday as Stadium Gains Approval, DENVER
POST, Nov. 4, 1998, at At; Ed Graney, Stadium Vote Means No ConflictAfter '01, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Nov. 5, 1998, at D7. In 1999, eleven major-league sports arenas, baseball stadiums, and
football stadiums opened - the most in one year in the history of the United States. Tony Perry, What
Staples Center Could Do for LA., LA TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 10, 1999, at 50.
2 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1. The proposed baseball stadium for the New York Yankees
sought by owner George Steinbrenner has an estimated starting cost of one billion dollars. Frank del
Olmo, Let's Put Some Ice on Stadium Fever; Pricey Proposalsfor New Parks in N.Y, San Diego, and LA. Could
Bankrupt Cities, LA. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1998, at M5.
3 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1. Yearly subsidies may actually more than double this amount.
In the unsuccessful proposed deal between the New England Patriots and the state of Connecticut for a
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With all of this money at stake, advocates of new sports facilities are
charged with the task of convincing government officials, as well as the
public at large, of the benefits of building new sports arenas or stadiums,
particularly as they are often heavily subsidized by the government. Subsidy
proponents often contend that sports facilities are good investments because
they generate positive net economic benefits for local communities. For
example, the advocates for a new football stadium in San Francisco used the
slogan Build the Stadium - Create the Jobs to urge support for the publicly
subsidized stadium.4 In the case of the San Francisco stadium, advocates for
the new facility argued the deal would bring substantial benefits to the city
through increased spending and jobs, particularly in an economically
depressed part of the city.' Moreover, these proponents claimed the new
revenues from sales and other taxes would pay the interest on the municipal
bonds, thus making the deal costless to the city.6
The rhetoric used to defend the public financing of new sports facilities
in any major city is pretty standard. The alleged benefits fall into three main
arguments. First, new sports facilities are claimed to create newjobs, derived
from people who attend and spend money at the new facility and other
activities and locations nearby.' Second, a team or important sporting event
brings prestige to the municipality, making it a major league city, which garners
free publicity and attracts new businesses in the process." Finally, proponents
claim that additional tax revenues and lease payments suffice to offset these
public subsidies and make publicly financed facilities good investments.9
Until 1960, most sports arenas and stadiums were privately owned.
However, publicly financed sports facilities are not a new phenomenon. The
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, Municipal Stadium in Cleveland, and
Memorial Stadium in Baltimore were all publicly financed.' ° Stadium and
arena ownership changed when major league professional sports became a
national, rather than a regional, phenomenon." The process of relocation
new football stadium, the state's yearly payment on the bond issuance for the new stadium would have
totaled $25 million for thirty years. Tina Cassidy, Stadium Deal Seen Debt-Heavy Initially, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 24, 1998, at Al.
4 Edward Epstein, Key Questions on Stadium Deal: Here Are Some Answers, but 49ers Scramble
Spefics, S.F. CHRONICLE, Apr. 10, 1997, at Al.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 2.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
i Id. In 1997, the number offranchises in major league sports was 113. Id. at 5. Until the recent
phenomenon of team expansion and relocation, the vast majority of major league sports teams were
located in California and the New England area.
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and expansion enabled many cities to become prospective cites for new major
league sports teams. This opportunity, in turn, led to competition among
cities to provide subsidies for new sports facilities to draw these teams to
their respective jurisdictions.
This paper seeks to evaluate this burgeoning area of public policy and
attempt to answer the difficult question: "Are publicly financed sports
facilities economically justifiable?" Part II will delve into the benefits of
publicly financed sports arenas and stadiums. This section will explain why
cities subsidize sports facilities, in hopes of improving job creation, tourism,
and downtown redevelopment in the region. Part III will flesh out the
structuring of these financial deals. This section will analyze the difference
between public and private financing; how the 1986 Tax Reform Act affected
municipal and state bonds are; and the different sources of revenue that make
up the deals, such as new taxes, the naming rights on the new sports facility,
new seating sales, and commercial licensing agreements. Part IVwill present
the objective criteria used to evaluate these financial deals. Part V will detail
the criticisms levied against publicly financed sports facilities. This section
will critique the uncertainty of revenue forecasts, the faulty assumptions
underlying the conclusion that one of these deals is self-financed, the sources
of error in these financial plans, and the concept of a better public investment.
Moreover, Part V will provide two examples of new sports facility financial
deals that are or would have been bad investment projects for their host
cities: the Edward Jones Dome in St. Louis (formerly the Trans-World
Dome) and the unsuccessful proposed football stadium for the New England
Patriots in Hartford. Part VI will present two successful publicly financed
sporting facilities, in Baltimore and Cleveland, and highlight the
characteristics of these deals that make themjustifiable. Finally, Part VII will
offer a case study: the Staples Center in Los Angeles. This section will
explain the details of the financial deal between the City of Los Angeles and
the L.A. Arena Development Company, LLC, the developer of the project.
Moreover, this section will evaluate the deal and explain why the Staples
Center is a justifiable public investment for the City of Los Angeles.
Through methodological analysis, the answer to the aforementioned
question becomes clear: On the whole, publicly financed sports facilities are
rarely justifiable for municipalities or other government entities. However,
in certain circumstances, as is the case with the Staples Center in Los
Angeles, financial deals can be structured with favorable benefits to both the
team and the respective government entity tojustify public investment in a
new sports arena or stadium.
20021
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II. BENEFITS: WHY CITIES SUBSIDIZE NEW SPORTS FACILITIES
A. Introduction
The relocation of existing major league sports teams, and the new
expansion teams arising in the National Football League (NFL), Major
League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and the
National Hockey League (NHL), have invigorated competition between
cities to draw major league sports teams to their respective cities. This
incidence allows teams to be selective in choosing a location and play cities
off of one another until they attain the most favorable deal on a new sports
facility. Consequently, teams remain passive players, calculating the long-
term effects of various locations and looking to augment their profits and
increase their franchise value.
With the economic advantages associated with sports teams, cities look
to justify subsidizing new sports facilities through benefits which they reap
from a team's presence. This justification becomes more important when
considering public opinion polls demonstrate on a city, county, and statewide
level, the overwhelming opposition to new sports facilities subsidies by the
majority of taxpayers. 2 However, to understand the benefits derived from
new publicly financed sports facilities, one must understand the motivation
behind the competition between cities for new sports franchises and
subsequent subsidization of new sports arenas and stadiums. Cities subsidize
new sports facilities for three main reasons. First, major league sports teams
cannot afford to pay for a new sports arena or stadium. Second, cities believe
that major league sports teams give the city a major league image, which parlays
into more publicity for the city and an interest from businesses for
relocation. Third, municipalities believe that these sports facilities are an
engine for local economic development, particularly in efforts to revitalize an
economically depressed area of the city. 3
B. Sports Teams Cannot Afford to Finance a New Facility
Major league sports teams do not have sufficient revenues from their
own sources and resources to pay for investments in new sports arenas and
12 Steven T. Khalil, New Stadium? The Republicans Sdl Out, DETROIT NEWs,June 23,1995, at El.
See also Raymond Keating, Taxpayers Lose in Stadium Socialism, ORLANDO BUSINESSJOURNAL, June 21,
1996, at 1 (citing a national poll by Media Research and Communications which found that eighty percent
of Americans oppose the use of their tax dollars for new sports facilities).
13 See infta text accompanying notes 35-37.
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stadiums. These sports franchises are too small and have too small a profit
margin to pay for the full cost of a $200 million, or more, facility. 4 If a new
sports facility was not subsidized, the interest and amortization for the new
sports arena or stadium would be approximately 10% of the construction
costs, including site acquisition and clearance.' s This debt payment would
be too expensive for a franchise to afford with the anticipation of making the
investment profitable. Therefore, local and state governments must bear
some, if not all, of the costs of building a new sports arena or stadium.
1. THE MAJOR LEAGUE IMAGE
Cities also seek sports franchises to acquire or retain a major league image.
A perfect example of this phenomenon arose when the Milwaukee Brewers
demanded a new baseball stadium with the threat of relocation. Gerald
Schwerm, Director of Public Works and Development, and Brigid Sullivan,
Director of Parks, Recreation and Culture, wrote to the Milwaukee County
Board explaining how important the Brewers were to not only the county,
but to the entire state. 6 While acknowledging the approximately $200
million that the Brewers brought to the county, Schwerm and Sullivan noted
that "[p]erhaps the greater and more important benefit of having the Brewers
in Milwaukee County, however, is that their presence stamps Milwaukee as
a 'Major League' city. .. " Schwerm and Sullivan also noted a subsequent
psychological benefit that citizens of Milwaukee gained from such a
distinction: DistinguishingMilwaukee as a "Major League" city "affect[s] not
only .the way people around the county (and in a surprisingly large part of the
world) view Milwaukee, but also the way Milwaukeeans view ourselves.""
Cities, therefore, seek this major league status not only for economic reasons
14 Noll & Zimbalist,supra note 1, at 495. The situation with the unsuccessful proposed football
stadium in Hartford for the New England Patriots demonstrates this principle. Robert Kraft, owner of
the Patriots, wanted to keep his team in Massachusetts, but the state and local governments there refused
to subsidize a new facility to a degree where Kraft's contribution would be affordable and the investment
profitable to the franchise. Given the unyielding position he faced, Kraft considered offers from other
cities and entered into an agreement with the State of Connecticut which would not have cost him any
out-of-pocket expense. Tom Condon, Kraft Can Be Thankful For Pats Deal: Should We?, HARTFORD
COURANT, Nov. 26, 1998, at A3 (explaining that Kraft would have had to pay $200 million of his own
money to build a new stadium in Massachusetts, while he would not have had to spend any money on
the $350 million stadium in Hartford).
is Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 28.
16 Letter from Gerald Schwerm, Director ofPublic Works and Development, and Brigid Sullivan,
Director of Parks, Recreation and Culture, to David F. Schulz, Milwaukee County Executive, and F.
Thomas Avent, Chairman of the Milwaukee County Board (Apr. 9, 1989) (on file with author).
17 Id.
18 Id.
2002]
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such as attracting new businesses, but also for the psychological benefit
produced by the presence of a major league sports team.
2. WHY TEAMS MOVE
Before 1984, the relocation of a major league sports franchise to a new
city was nearly unthinkable. However, two cases, Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Commission v. NFL19 and NFL v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd.,20 widened the
rights of individual franchises to move from one city to another, despite the
league's objections. With relocation a more viable option for teams, and with
MLB and the NFL expanding, intense competition between cities to acquire
or retain sports franchises has generated unprecedented levels of municipal
and state spending.
21
With such options, sports teams can look to relocate with two simple
goals in mind: to augment their profits and to increase their franchise value.2
New sports facilities can benefit team owners by dramatically increasing
franchise values.' In fact, disparities between sports teams' values are re-
lated more to arena or stadium revenue than to the geographic market size
in which the team plays.24 For example, the Baltimore Orioles' franchise
increased its value by 27%, up to $164 million, through the profitable
operation of Camden Yards, which was built in 1992.25 Since new stadiums
maximize team profits and thus overall value, small to mid-size cities that
were not previously considered major league have become sites of profitable
business opportunities for sports franchises.26 Except for a few large,
19 LA Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
0 NFL v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
21 John Riley, Fields of Green, Pricey Palaces a Bonanza for Team Owners, Players, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, Sept. 15, 1996, at H1.
Antitrust Implications of Sports Franchise Relocation: Hearings on Professional Sports
Franchise Relocation - Antitrust Implications Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
149-54 (1996) (written testimony of Andrew Zimbalist, Smith College Economist).
23 Michael K. Ozanian, Sports Stocks and Bonds, FIN. WORLD, May 20,1996, at 42. In fact, Gerald
Scully, a professor at the University of Texas and author of THE BUSINESS OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL,
estimates that a new baseball stadium adds between $50 million and $75 million in creased value to the
franchise. Larry Stone, Mariners at a Crossroads: Will Stadium Revenue Improve Team?, SEATTLE TIMES, July
5, 1998, at DI.
24 Ozanian, supra note 23, at 42. This fact is accentuated in the NFL. NFL teams derive a lower
proportion of revenues from regular ticket sales and more from television rights and licensing than teams
in other sports. Noll & Zimbalist,supra note 1, at 496. This difference, coupled with the NFL's extensive
revenue sharing, leads NFL franchises to maximize components of their stadium revenue that are not
shared and thus enable them to increase the value of their respective franchises.
2 Michael K Ozanian, Suite Deals: Why New Stadiums Are Shaking Up the Pecking Order of Sports
Franchises, FIN. WORLD, May 9, 1995, at 53.
6 Adam Safir, If You Build It, They Will Come: The Politics of Financing Sports Stadium Construction,
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lucrative markets, like NewYork and Los Angeles, competing cities are likely
to be reasonably similar in their attractiveness as a sports market This fact
is, in part, due to new stadium technology, such as luxury suites and
elaborate concessions, which allows demographically lesser cities - such as
Charlotte, Jacksonville, and Nashville - to be competitive against larger
cities.28 This parity amongst potential suitor locales and the fervor to obtain
the aforementioned major league status has even caused cities, such as St.
Louis, to build a publicly financed facility before a major league sports team
had been secured to occupy it.
29
3. CITiEs' GOALS FOR NEW SPORTS FACILITIES
With the significant price tags on new sports facilities, often upwards of
$400 million to $500 million, municipalities building new sports arenas or
stadiums must convince their constituents of the benefits derived from these
new sports facilities. New sports facility proponents often claim a new
stadium or arena is self-financing, meaning that the rent paid plus the taxes
collected will be sufficient to cover the city's expenditures.' Advocates for
new sports facilities also argue new stadiums or arenas will bring substantial
economic benefits to a city through increased spending and jobs, particularly
in economically depressed parts of the city.3' This belief has influenced cities
to plan major redevelopment projects, mostly focusing on downtown areas,
with the new sports arena or stadium as the cornerstone.
For more than forty years, leaders of most central cities have watched
with frustration the growth of suburbs and the subsequent dispersion away
from downtown areas.32 This movement ofproduction, manufacturing, and
service industries, coupled with the development of extensive recreational
and retail centers miles from downtown areas, has created different
commuting patterns and multinucleated urban centers.33 By using new
13J.L. & POL. 937,938 (1997).
2- Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, The Econonic Impact of Sports Teans and Facilities, in
SPORTSJOBS, & TAXES: THEECONOMIC IMPACTOF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS, supra note 1, at 83.
18 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 495.
"9 Mike Reilly, A Leap of Faith. . . Sales Pitch for Stadium Omitted Key Details, ST. LouIs POST-
DISPATCH,June 24, 1990, at BI.
30 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 14; but see infa text accompanying note 141.
31 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 1.
3. Mark S. Rosentraub, Stadiums and Urban Space, in SPORTS,JOBS, & TAXES: THE ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF SpoRTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS, supra note 1, at 178.
3 Id.
2002]
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sports facilities as a way to spur redevelopment in downtown areas, city
leaders hope to reverse or retard the effects of suburbanization.
34
The primary objective in building a new sports arena or stadium in a
downtown area is to attract large crowds to the area to underscore its vitality,
centrality, and potential for additional economic activity and development.3 5
Civic leaders hope that these crowds will then encourage investment in
related entertainment facilities such as restaurants, bars, and retail outlets.
Such economic and social activity, it is argued, will then attract corporations
back to the downtown area, to fight lagging occupancy rates in downtown
office complexes.
A secondary objective to this approach to downtown redevelopment is
that people from outside of the region, either tourists or those in the city on
business, might visit the downtown area because of the presence of a team
or an event at the new facility. 36 This type of plan focuses less heavily on the
team, but rather on recreational business, such as national and international
competitions, concerts, meetings, and conventions that compliment the
sports team's draw to tourists and residents of the city to the downtown
area.37 This influx of visitors to the various events will theoretically bring
new money to the region and the city. Advocates of such an approach argue
this occurrence will spur further development in the downtown area, thus
creating more jobs, and will provide a greater tax base to reimburse the city
for its expenditures on the new sports facility.
IH1. How THE NEW SPORTS FACILITY DEALS ARE FINANCED
A. Introduction
Building a new sports facility is an expensive endeavor. The average cost
of six sports facilities built between 1995 and 1996 exceed $150 million,
3 Id. at 179.
35 Id. at 180. Cities which have attempted such downtown redevelopment proects include
Baltimore, Denver, St. Louis, Phoenix, and Cleveland. See text accompanying infa notes 158-165 & 201-
229. Of interest is the new type of urban development concepts that civic leaders have formulated in
attempting to battle the effects of suburbanization. New sports facilities in downtown Cleveland,
Baltimore, and Denver have departed from the traditional urban development model of automobile-
inspired designs and locations. See Robert A. Baade & Allen R. Sanderson, The Employnent Effect of Teams
and Sports Facilities, in SPORTS, JOBS, & TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND
STADIUMS, supra note 1, at 95 (explaining that these more synergistic urban stadium plans seem to
promote economic development beyond that experienced by facilities shaped by automotive imperatives).
36 Rosentraub, supra note 32, at 181.
3 Id.
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while new stadiums for football or baseball cost $200 million or more.3"
With these hefty price tags come equally significant and complex financing
deals. This section will explain the developments of these deals, the issue of
whether a deal is public or private, how the 1986 Tax Reform Act affects that
decision, and the sources of revenue which ultimately pay for the
construction and maintenance of a new sports facility.
B. The Initial Stages of a Financing Deal
The initial stages of a new sports facility financing deal usually include
various studies, soil samples, and surveys undertaken to assess the risk of the
project and any potential conflicts with the surrounding economy that could
endanger the project after construction begins.39 Moreover, the interested
parties - usually an investment group and a municipal government -
commission a preacquisition study which addresses the impact the project
will have on the surrounding area.' This type of study includes a check of
zoning requirements and restrictions on the land upon which the new sports
facility will be built. Moreover, the study will assess the expected growth in
the area, access to transportation or main highway arteries, public parking,
suitability of locale to prospective tenants, current and prospective buildings
in the area, and the overall personality of the vicinity.
41
Once these formalities conclude, the development ofa new sports facility
proceeds in three stages. First, the site is acquired and the existing facilities
that are unusable for the new sports facility are destroyed. Second, the new
sports facility and its supporting infrastructure, such as sewer link-ups, utility
connections, parking, and transportation access, are built.43 Finally, the
repair, maintenance, and operation activities are undertaken to support events
in the new facility.44 This process of building a new sports facility, from the
initial formalities to the three stages of building development, is extremely
38 KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE SPORTS FRANCHISE GAME: CITIES IN PURSUIT OF SPORTS
FRANCHISES, EVENTS, STADIUMS, AND ARENAS 2 (1995).
39 J. BAGBY, REAL ESTATE FINANCING DESK BOOK 84-92 (1990). This book provides an
examination of the step-by-step process of financing commercial real estate projects.
40 Id. at 86. Zoning data will ensure that the selected site can be used for its intended purpose,
while assessing the potential water, sewer, and utility costs.
41 Id.
42 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 7. In some cases, businesses will be forced to move to make
room for the new sports facility and its adjoining redevelopment. See Mike Swift, Steam Plant Stands in
Way of Stadium: Talks on Relocation Described as Difficult, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 27, 1998, at Al
(explaining that CTG Resources, Inc., a steam plant, would have been forced to relocate because of the
proposed football stadium and other redevelopment projects in downtown Hartford).
43 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 7.
4 Id.
2002]
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time-consuming and costly. These costs must be paid by either the private
investment group, often the team owners, or the sponsoring city.
C. Public or Private Financing?
1. WHO PAYS FOR WHAT
A new sports facility is considered publicly financed if it is paid for and
managed by a local government authority. Conversely, a new sports facility
is considered private when the team owners pay for said expenses. The
standard new sports facility financial plan divides expenditures into three
components: those to be financed by various forms of up-front payments
such as pouring rights, naming rights, and special seat licensing; those to be
paid for by the team owners out-of-pocket or financed by a loan; and those
initially paid for either by the budget of the local government or the sale of
bonds.4'
Standard practice dictates the local government pays for most, if not all,
of the site preparation. 46 In most cases, the government will not need to pay
anything for the acquisition of the land because it typically already owns it.
47
Direct construction costs are often shared by both the team and the
municipality." Once the new sports arena or stadium is built, the lease terms
regarding the sharing of stadium or arena revenues, the defrayal of operating
and maintenance costs, and the responsibility for management of the new
facility differ substantially from city to city and team to team.
49
While the team owners pay for their share of the costs of building a new
sports facility either in cash or through loans, cities pay for their expenditures
in much more complex ways. To pay for its share, a local municipality will
rely on a combination of rents, taxes, and fees on activities related to the new
arena or stadium.-" In addition, a city will often impose other added taxes -
unrelated to the new sports facility - and will cut public services to pay for
the expenditures for which it is responsible.
45 Id. at 12. Note that the use of bonds simply spreads the city's payment over a number of years
rather than concentrating the payment during the period of construction.
4 Id. at7.
47 Id. However, while this dedication of land for the new sports facility does not require any cash
payment, the site still has monetary value. New sports facility financing deals rarely attribute any
monetary number to the land in such instances, but the value of the land can be determined in the
approximate selling amount it might command if sold for another development purpose.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at6.
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2. TWO EXAMPLES: PHOENIX AND SEATTLE
Two recent sports facilities and their respective host cities demonstrate
the way in which modern-day sports facilities are paid for: Bank One
Ballpark in Phoenix Safeco Field in Seattle. In Phoenix, the financial deal for
the $346 million Bank One Ballpark was closed before the city had secured
a team to play in the new stadium.51 Maricopa County, which hosts both the
City of Phoenix and the Bank One Ballpark, agreed to pay for $253 million
worth of the deal through a quarter-cent sales tax. 2 In addition to the
quarter-cent sales tax, Maricopa County receives 5% of the revenue from the
sales of luxury suites and club seats, plus $325,000 for the naming rights on
the facility.53 The private investment group, led by Jerry Coangelo, the
owner of the Arizona Diamondbacks, is required to pay the estimated $140
million in stadium maintenance for the next thirty years.?4 However, to
offset this cost, the investment group retains all remaining baseball revenue
from tickets, skyboxes, parking, and concession."5
In Seattle, the King County Public Facilities District oversaw the
construction of Safeco Field, which opened on July 15, 1999. Safeco Field
cost $517.6 million to build, with the King County Public Facilities District
receiving $340 million in public financing to help build the stadium.-6 The
State of Washington helps service this bond issue with a credit of .017% of
existing sales tax revenues generated in King County, a scratch-off sports
theme lottery game, and the sale of specialized commemorative license
plates. King County also helps service the bonds with a 0.5% sales tax
increase on food and beverages, a 2% increase on the county's rental car tax,
51 Expansion Efforts Had Many Twists, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Mar. 10, 1995, at B4.
s- Tax for D'Backs' Stadium Surpassing Expectations, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, May 1, 1996, at D7.
This money was contingent, at the time, on Jerry Coangelo's acquisition of an expansion franchise, which
turned out to be the Arizona Diamondbacks. The other part of this contingent agreement was Maricopa
County's guarantee that attendance at baseball games would total between one million and two and a half
million people a year.
53 David Schwartz and Eric Miller, County Gets a New Deal on Baseball Plan Would Cap Sales-Tax
Outlay at $238 Million, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Feb. 12, 1994, at Al.
S4 Id.
5 Id.
56 Mike Lewis, Taxpayers Off Hook for Safeco Field: Mariners Drop Attenpt to Recoup Cost Overruns
from the Public, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 16,2001, at B1.
57 Joseph Turner, et al., Legislature '95:71w Stadium Session - LegislatureApproves Ballpark Deal, But
IKlng County May Not Go Along, MORNING NEWS TRIBUNE (LEWISTON), Oct. 15,1995, at Al.
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and a 5% admissions tax on stadium tickets.58 The team owners of the Seattle
Mariners paid $75 million for the construction of their new stadium.?9
Safeco Field has turned out to be a success for both the respective
government entities and the Seattle Mariners. The King County Council
recently voted to refinance $240 million in bonds in 2003 to take advantage
of lower interest rates, possibly saving taxpayers up to $11 million.'
Moreover, the taxes levied to pay the County's debt service payments have
garnered approximately $20 million more than expected, allowing the
County to pay down its bond debt more quickly.6 On the other hand, the
Seattle Mariners have reaped substantial benefits from Safeco Field. With its
first full season in Safeco Field, the Mariners reported a net income of $14.26
million for the 2000 MLB season/a The Mariners invested such profits into
increasing their payroll, which has led to two consecutive post-season playoff
series and a MLB record 116 wins in the 2001 season.' In addition, the value
of the Mariner franchise has increased from $107 million in 1997, to $236 in
1999 due, in large part, to the building of Safeco Field.'M
Both of these examples demonstrate how private investment groups and
local and state governments can cooperate to jointly fund a new sports
facility. Although the team owners in both cases contributed millions of
dollars, both of these deals, like most sports facility financing deals in the
country, would be considered public because the majority of the financing
in both cases was done by local and state governments.
so Id.
59 Mike Lewis, Taxpayers Off Hook for Safeco Field: Mariners Drop Attenpt to Recoup Cost Overns
from the Public, SEATTLE PoST-INTELLIGENCER Feb. 17, 2001, at Bl. The cost overruns totaled more than
$100 million on Safeco Field. The Mariners had sought to recoup this money from local taxpayers, but
agreed to drop such efforts in return for the right to pursue legal claims against the designer and builders
of the stadium.
60 Margaret Taus, Safeo Field Taxes May End Three Years Early, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Apr. 2, 2002, at B6.
61 Id.
6 Angelo Bruscas, Safeco Field Yields $14M Profit for M's: Team Says Money was Used to Increase
Payroll to $80M, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 8, 2001, at Dl. This net income stood as a stark
contrast to the 1994-1997 Major League Baseball seasons when the Mariners reported substantial losses
- up to $28 million a year.
63 Id.
64 Alan Snel, Safeco Field Will Make M's a Valued mnemnbertf Major League Baseball, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCERJuly 2, 1999, at Al.
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D. The Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 19866'
1. THE IMPETUS FOR PUBLIC FINANCING
As aforementioned, sports teams cannot afford to privately finance a new
sports facility.' More importantly, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 produces a
scenario where the only viable financing deal for a new sports facility requires
the local municipality to fund most, if not all, of the project through tax-
exempt bonds.67 In fact, the present value of a federal revenue loss on $225
million worth of tax-exempt bonds is between $47 million and $94 million,
depending on the interest rate differential.' In this regard, financing a new
sports arena through taxable bonds adds significant debt to an already
expensive project. Therefore, as this section will more explicitly detail, the
revisions in the tax code provide a disincentive for private financing and a
clear incentive for public financing of new sports facilities.
2. A PRECURSOR: THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984
Prior to 1984, to aid sports franchises in financing multi-million dollar
sports arenas and stadiums, state and local governments would issue
municipal debt to raise funds necessary for construction of the new facility.69
Since sports franchises were not financially able to issue debt of this size at
an affordable interest rate, municipal debt was an attractive option because
it was tax-exempt. However, when the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 took
effect, two provisions affected the municipal financing of new sports
facilities. First, the Act limited states in the number of overall Industrial
Development Bonds issued within a calendar year.7' Second, the Act
prohibited the use of Industrial Development Bonds to acquire land, existing
property, or certain enumerated types of facilities.7' These provisions
6s Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514).
See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
67 Seegenerally GENERALEXPLANATIONOFTHIETAxREFoRMACTOF 1986, H.R. Doc. No. 3838
(1st Sess. 1986).
68 DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, THE PRIVATE USE OF TAx-ExEMPT BONDS: CONTROLLING PUBLIC
SUBSIDYOF PRIVATE ACTIVITIES, at chap. 2 (1991).
69 John D. FinertyJr., Subverting the Internal Revenue Code in the "Gaine"vfSportsStadium Financing,
1 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 301,305 (1991).
70 Thomas, Special Report:An Analysis of the New Industrial Development Bond Rules, TAX NOTES,
Apr. 13, 1984, at 694.
71 Id. at 692.
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significantly restricted, but did not entirely eliminate, tax-exempt sports
facility financing. However, this Act was a harbinger of what types of
restrictions the 1986 Tax Reform Act would place on such financing options.
3. THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 AND TAX-EXEMPT BOND
FINANCING
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 significantly altered the way in which cities
and private investment groups financed new sports arenas and stadiums.
The Act removed sports facilities from the federal exemption list, which had
allowed proceeds from Industrial Development Bonds to be used for sports
arena and stadium developments and remain tax-exempt to investors. 2 As
one tax expert noted, the Act "raised significant new barriers to the use of tax-
exempt debt for public and private purposes, and will change the face of
public finance .... 73
The Act contained several provisions that affected tax-exempt bonds for
public sports facilities in three different ways. First, under Section 141 of the
Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a sports
facility's qualification for tax-exemptprivate activity bonds is subject to both the
private business use test and the private security or payment test.74 Under the use test,
a bond issue fails to be tax-exempt if "more than 10% of the proceeds of the
issue are to be used for any private business use."' A bond issue fails under
the payment test, if "more than 10% of the proceeds of such issue is... directly
or indirectly secured by any interest in property used or to be used for a
private business use, or payments in respect of such property."76 A new
sports facility may only fail one of these tests in order to receive tax-exempt
bonds for financing a new sports arena or stadium."
Private sports teams will almost always fail the 10% tests because the
teams usually use more than 10% of the new sports facility's services and
receive more than 10% of the proceeds from such bond issuances.
Therefore, in order to be tax-exempt, new sports arena or stadium bond
issues must be structured so that no more than 10% of the debt is secured by
Finerty, supra note 69, at 308-09.
7 Uhlfelder, 1986 At Will Change the Face of Publir Financing, TAX NOTES, Nov. 1986.
74 I.R.C. S 141(a) (1994).
75 I.R.C. S 141(b)(1) (1994).
76 I.RC. S 141(b)(2) (1994).
77 DENNISZIMMERMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TAx-EXEMPTBONDS ANDTHE
ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS STADIUMS 5 (1996). Private sports teams almost always fail the
private-business test because teams usually use more than 10% of a sports facility's services. Therefore,
in order to be tax-exempt, the stadium bond issues must be structured so that no more than 10% of the
debt is secured by the stadium itself Id.
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the sports franchise. Moreover, since cities will most often pass both of the
10% tests, they are forced to secure the tax-exempt bonds. Therefore, to
make a new sports facility financially viable, cities must service at least 90%
of the federally tax-exempt debt in order to enter into such deals with these
sports franchises.
Another important change that affected tax-exempt bond financing of
new sports arenas was the removal of sports facilities from the exemption list.
This list had allowed said facilities to exceed the two aforementioned 10%
tests.7' The final provision which affected sports facility financing was the
limitation on the total volume of most tax-exempt private-activity bonds for
exempt facilities that could be issued by all political jurisdictions in a state.
Two new sports facility deals demonstrate the effects of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 on financing such projects. The new Milwaukee baseball
stadium, Miller Park, opened in 2001 and was financed through a $160
million tax-exempt bond issue, a $40 million capital contribution from the
team owners, and a $50 million loan from the state financed through taxable
debt.80 The tax-exempt bond issue will be paid by a five county regional sales
tax of.001% s The other example demonstrates the detrimental effects the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 can have on municipalities. In St. Louis, the State
of Missouri, the County of St. Louis, and the City of St. Louis wholly
financed the $258 million dollar Edward Jones Dome through a series of
bonds. 2 The debt payments totaling $10 million a year over thirty years, plus
7S Dennis Zimmerman, Subsidizing Stadiumns: Who Benefits and Who Pays, in SPORTS, JOBS, &
TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS, supra note 1, at 136. Prior to the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, sports facilities, convention halls, and parking facilities were all considered
private activities appropriate for tax-exempt financing.
79 I.R.C. § 141-2, 146 (1994). This limitation capped bond issuance at the greater of $50 per
resident or $150 million total. Of interest are the legal challenges to the issuance of tax-exempt bonds for
new sports facilities. For example, one former city mayor, William F. Poe of the City ofTampa, filed suit
seeking to enjoin the city from constructing a new stadium financed by a tax-exempt bond issuance for
the Tampa Bay Buccaneers. See Poe v. Hillsborough County, 695 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1997). Poe defended
his position by pointing to the Florida State Constitution, which prohibits lending public credit to aid a
private corporation. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, S 10(c). However, the Florida Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the use of public funds to finance the new stadium, ruling that such funding did not
violate the Florida State Constitution. Poe, 695 So. 2d at 675-79. The Court expressed sympathy for
Poe's argument that the financial deal was "too sweet" for the Buccaneers, but pointed out that a remedy
for such a situation would be at the ballot box. Id. See also Rodney Fort, Direct Democracy and the Stadium
Mess, in SPORTS,JOBS, &TAXES: THEECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS, supra note
1, at 146-177 (detailing the processes, both through referendum and legislative approval, of validating
sports facility financial deals).
8o Zimmerman, supra note 78, at 137.
81 Id.
82 Reilly, supra note 29, at B1.
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the various governmental contributions to the stadiums preservation fund,
makes the total government contribution for the stadium $720 million. 3
The St. Louis deal demonstrates how the provisions of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 handicap local and state governments in entering into agreements to
finance.
Since local and state governments must wholly or partially finance new
sports facilities through tax-exempt bonds to make a new sports arena or
stadium affordable, the impetus for team owners to pay out-of-pocket for
such a facility lessens in comparison.' If the difference between the interest
rate of taxable and tax-exempt bonds is within 5%, the taxable debt would be
a viable source of funds for a team owner."5 However, since such a situation
is rare, and since local and state governments are eager to offer economically
attractive deals to sports teams to relocate to their jurisdiction, most new
sports facility deals are financed partially, if not in whole, by tax-exempt
bonds. This standard model for financing such deals, therefore, puts cities
at an alarming disadvantage in the deal-making process, particularly in terms
of up-front expenditures.
E. Sources of Revenue Within New Sports Facility Deals
1. OVERVIEW AND HISTORY OF SPORTS FACILITY REVENUE
While the local and state government, and in most cases the team owners,
front hundreds of millions of dollars for the new sports facilities, these
financial deals also contain provisions for both parties to receive
reimbursement, and often enhancement, revenue for their respective
investments. The history and metamorphosis of sports arena and stadium
revenue production helps decipher the current revenue structures set out by
these financial deals. During the 1950's, most teams' revenues came from
inside the sports arena or stadium. Primarily, these revenues consisted
almost entirely of ticket sales, with minor supplements from concessions,
publications, and advertising within the facility. 6  This lopsided revenue
base changed in the 1960's as revenues from broadcasting surpassed revenues
produced inside the sports arena or stadium. 7 The 1970's saw the rise of
league-sharing and collective bargaining agreements, which focused their
83 Id.
84 This situation is further magnified when set in the context of the current fervor and
competition between cities to attract major league sports teams. See text accompanying supra notes 12-36.
85 Uhifelder, supra note 73.
86 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 8.
87 Id.
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efforts on generating revenues from broadcasting and ticket sales.""
However, in the 1980's, there was a rapid growth in revenues from other
sources. For example, a new emphasis was placed on concessions, which
through a greater sophistication in quantity and quality of products, drew
greater revenues. s9 This evolution of sports arena and stadium revenue
culminated in the 1990's with a diverse base of revenue sources from which
these financial deals can draw: taxes, naming rights, special seating
opportunities, and commercial licensing agreements.
2. TAXES
One way in which local and state governments pay for the bond issuance
for a new sports facility is through taxes. These financial deals often include
one or a combination of three forms of taxes: property taxes, in-stadium
taxes, and taxes collected outside the stadium. First, in some cases, the
owners of the sports team pay a form of property tax for the new sports arena
or stadium. ° Second, inside the stadium, two different forms of taxes exist.
One is the tax revenue from the local and state sales taxes applicable to
concessions. 91 The other tax is often in the form of a special tax on ticket
sales, which are often earmarked in these financial agreements for things
such as construction costs." Third, some financial plans attribute to the new
sports arena or stadium tax revenues collected outside of the facility. To the
extent that new sports arenas and stadiums generate new business in the
surrounding area, some financial plans also attribute projected tax revenues
from these off-site locations to the new facility in terms of revenue
generation for the local or state government.93 This type of revenue is called
tax increment financing, which is often used as evidence to the claim that
new sports facilities will have no expected net cost to a particular city.
However, many financial plans contain new tax bases from outside the
stadium which create revenue to reimburse the city, county, or state
government for its bond issuance. These type of taxes come in the form of
88 Id.
89 Id. By nature, each sport creates a physical limit to the number of good seats that can be
created in a new sports facility. Therefore, due to the ideal arena or stadium size, concessions, special
seating arrangements, and commercial licensing agreements have accounted for a growing percentage of
revenues in sports facility financing. Id. at 17-18.
90 Id. at 13. This money does not constitute a rental payment, which some financial deals include.
91 Id. at 14.
9 Id. The Metrodome in Minneapolis is funded, in part, by a 10% ticket tax. See Zimmerman,
supra note 78, at 124.
93 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 14.
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state lottery taxes,94 special sales taxes,9 alcohol and tobacco taxes,96 and car
rental taxes,97 to name but a few. These three general forms of tax revenue
enable the local and state governments to collect substantial revenue to offset
the debt incurred from their bond issuance.
3. NAMING RIGHTS
A supplemental source of revenue, earmarked for the team or the city, is
the sale or lease of a facility's name. A business will pay either a yearly or
one-time sum for the naming rights to a new, or in some cases, an already
existing, facility. As of 1998, forty-one arenas and stadiums had naming
rights contracts.9" One of the first naming rights contracts was a twenty-five
year, $1.5 million agreement signed in 1973 between the Buffalo-based
maker of Coffee Rich non-dairy creamer and Erie County, New York.99 In
comparison, demonstrating the development of naming rights revenue,
Staples, Inc., signed a twenty year, $116 million contract with the L.A. Arena
Development Company, LLC, to put its name on the new home of the
NBA's Los Angeles Lakers and Los Angeles Clippers, as well as the NHL's
Los Angeles Kings.' The naming rights phenomenon has clearly developed
into a significant source of revenue in new sports facility financial deals.
This source of revenue is utilized by major league facilities as well as
colleges and universities. For example, in Syracuse, New York, the Carrier
Corporation, a residential heating and air conditioning unit manufacturer,
secured the name of the Carrier Dome of Syracuse University for $2.75
94 The State of Maryland uses state lottery taxes to repay the debt on Camden Yards. Id. The
State ofWashington services its bond issuance, in part, through a scratch-off lottery game. See Safir, supra
note 26, at 950.
% Special sales taxes are sources of additional revenue for the Alamo Dome in San Antonio,
Coors Field in Denver, Arlington Park in Texas, and the Bank One Ballpark in Arizona. See Noll &
Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 14. King County funds Safeco Field through a half-cent sales tax on food and
beverages. See Safir, supra note 26, at 950.
% Alcohol and tobacco taxes are generating revenue for the City of Cleveland to pay back debt
forJacobs Field. See Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 14. Also, the City of Minneapolis receives revenue
from a two percent sales tax on liquor sales to repay its debt on the Metrodome. See Zimmerman, supra
note 78, at 124.
97 Car rental taxes are creating revenue for the City of Phoenix to repay its investment in the
America West Arena. Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 14. Also, King County added a two percent
increase on its rental car tax to pay back debt for Safeco Field. See Safir, supra note 26, at 950.
98 Rich Westhead, Companies Play the Name Game at Sport Stadiums, LA DAILY NEWS, Jan. 20,
1998, at B9.
99 Id.
100 Id.
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million.' °' In major league sports, Fleet Bank, in 1995, signed a fifteen year,
$30 million contract to name the FleetCenter in Boston.'1  Under the terms
of the financing arrangement for the Bank One Ballpark in Arizona,
Maricopa County is guaranteed $325,000 a year from income generated for
the naming rights of the new ballpark. 3 Other recent naming rights
arrangements which have taken place in correlation with new major league
sports facilities are Coors Field in Denver, the Arco Arena in Sacramento, the
United Center in Chicago, the Target Center Arena in Minneapolis, the
America West Arena in Phoenix, the Delta Center in Salt Lake City, and the
Bank One Ballpark in Arizona.' 4 Naming rights, therefore, are clearly a
viable and potentially substantial source of revenue in new sports facility
financial agreements.
4. SPECIAL SEATING REVENUE
Another source of revenue used to pay for a new sports arena or stadium
is that gained from special seating arrangements like Personal Seat Licenses
(PSLs) luxury boxes. PSLs seat leases allow customers to pay a fixed fee to
obtain the right to purchase season tickets.'05 This type of special seating
arrangement first began in 1971 to help finance the opening of Texas
Stadium in Dallas." Sold as seat options, these PSLs garnered between $300
and $1,000 per seat.'0 7 Contemporary PSLs emerged in 1993 in Charlotte,
where the Carolina Panthers raised $150 million through the sale of PSLs
ranging from $600 to $5400.l0s Besides being an additional source of revenue
lot D. PETERSON, CONVENTION CENTERS, STADIUMS AND ARENAS 48 (1989).
102 Westhead, supra note 98, at B9.
103 Schwartz & Miller, supra note 53, at Al.
104 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 37-49. The renaming of existing arenas for the purposes of
additional revenue has almost become prominent in major league sports. Examples of this occurrence
are the Continental Airlines Arena in NewJersey, the Great Western Forum in Los Angeles, Qualcomm
Stadium in San Diego, and 3-Coin Park in San Francisco.
100 Id. at 20. PSLs can be perpetual, as they will be for the Pacific Bell Park in San Francisco, or,
as more commonly the case, for fixed periods of time, like the ten year life of PSLs in the Oakland
Coliseum. See Edward Epstein and John King, Handshake in Ballpark LeaselGiants to Pay $1.2 Million
Annual Rent, S.F. CHRONICLE, Dec. 17,1996, atA17; Renee Koury, How Raiders Deal Went Sour, SANJOSE
MERCURY NEws, Feb. 21, 1997, at A28.
106 Inside the Ownership of Professional Team Sports, (Chicago: Team Marketing Report 1997), at 60.
107 Id.
'o0 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 20. The City of St. Louis also raised $70 million for
relocation fees for the St. Louis Rams by charging between $250 and $4500 per PSL. While many new
stadium deals include PSLs as part of the revenue consideration for either the team or the city, some have
been successful while others have failed. In Charlotte, the sale of PSLs met the $150 million goal.
However, in Oakland, the city and county governments lose $40 million a year because the PSL sales
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for either the team or the local and state governments, PSLs do not count
against the aforementioned 10% tests that apply in determining whether or
not the bond issuance for financing the new sports facility will be tax-exempt
or not."° Therefore, a team or city can receive up-front fees in the form of
PSL sales that enable the new sports facility to retain its tax-exempt status for
the bonds used to fund its construction.
The other form of special seating that produces significant revenue for
a new sports facility deal is the luxury suite. This type of special seating can
be analogized to hotel rooms within a sports arena or stadium. Luxury suites
provide the lease holder with amenities such as parking passes, private
elevators, a bathroom, a wetbar, a television, a refrigerator, an ice machine,
food and beverage service, and additional outdoor seating."0 Leases on such
luxury suites usually cost between $50,000 to $200,000 a year for a seven to
ten year period."' The revenue generated from the sale of luxury suites,
often designated for the team rather than the city in most financial deals on
new sports facilities, can total millions of dollars per year. This significant
amount of revenue, like PSLs, does not count against the 10% tests, thus
keeping the bond issuance tax-exempt for the particular sports facility.
5. COMMERCIAL LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS
One final area of revenue in new sports facility financial deals is
commercial licensing agreements, mainly in the form of concessions and
marketing opportunities. Teams or local governments derive revenue from
concessions in one of three ways: charging royalties based on sales, charging
a fixed fee not based on sales, or a combination of the two.112 The benefit of
a fixed fee is that it provides the team or the city with more up-front money.
However, concessionaires are less willing to commit to larger up front fees." 3
Royalty-based arrangements provide greater financial incentives for the team
or the city, but they provide the investor - the city or the team - with less up-
front funds." 4 Therefore, many concession agreements combine the two to
maximize the benefits of both arrangements. This situation allows for the
reached only $58.9 million, well short of the anticipated $99 million they expected.
109 Id. at 21.
110 S. Byers, Skyboxes: A Hot Ticket, CHARLOTrE BUS.J., May 28,1990, at 1.
III Id.
112 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 18.
113 Id. In considering these types of agreements, concessionaires evaluate the potential for the
team to attract spectators. The more successful the team, the higher the value of the concession
agreement. This situation actually provides an incentive for the owners of the team to field the strongest
team possible, if economically viable, to maximize revenue derived from their concession agreement.
114 Id.
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team or city to receive up-front fees, which helps defray the initial cost of the
new sports facility, while also gaining the potential for greater revenue
through the royalty facet of the concession agreement.
The marketing opportunities that produce revenue for the team or the
city arise in two main areas: broadcasting and product licensing agreements.
Local broadcasting is usually sponsored by national firms in product fields
such as beer, gas, and automobiles.'15 Product licensing agreements, whether
sold by a league or a team, are usually made with national manufacturers of
consumer products like clothing, athletic gear, soda, and beer."6 These
income-generating sources have grown in their percentage of sports arena
and stadium revenue. For example, these two areas of commercial licensing
agreements constitute more than half of the revenue in the NFL and more
than $10 million per team in MLB." 7 Therefore, careful attention is paid to
both of these factors in the fleshing out of new sports facility financial
agreements.
IV. OBJECTIVE METHODS OF EVALUATING THESE FINANCIAL DEALS
A. Overview
Current research has failed, thus far, to construct a model that can
accurately predict the economic contribution of professional sports and their
facilities to a city."' Therefore, to evaluate new sports facilities' financial
deals, and thus answer the question originally presented at the beginning of
this Article, one must piece together objective criteria from experts in the
field in order to offer as comprehensive an analysis and answer as possible.
Such criteria arises in analyzing whether a sports team and facility make a net
positive contribution to the economic development of the city and provide
the best possible investment opportunity for the municipality.
B. The Cost/Benefit Analysis of a New Sports Facility
To ascertain whether or not a sports facility is an economicallyjustifiable
public investment, one must decipher whether or not the sports arena or
stadium produces net benefits. To determine if the sports facility produces
a net benefit, one must add the consumption value of the team and facility
115 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 27, at 71.
116 Id.
117 Id.
Il Baade & Sanderson, supra note 35, at 98.
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to the city with the increase in local economic development." 9  The
consumption value arises in three components: attendance, broadcasting, and
the externality value of having a major league sports team. Local economic
development can be measured through the increase in sales to people from
outside the city as well as through job creation in the area. This figure, or
determination, if one considers unquantifiable factors, derived from the
consumption value and the local economic development must be weighed
against the annual cost of the stadium - debt payments and operating costs
- and the environmental, congestion, and public safety costs associated with
the project in order to conclude whether or not net benefits are created by
the new facility."2
In determining the consumption value and the local economic develop-
ment, both direct benefits and indirect benefits must be considered. Direct
benefits include any incremental consumer surplus from all the consump-
tion activities produced by the new sports facility - games, broadcasts, and
concession products that are more than the goods and services that were
previously consumed.' Indirect benefits include all the consumption that
takes place outside of the new sports facility."z Job creation can arise as both
a direct and an indirect benefit. Some jobs may be created through the
building of a new sports facility; these jobs would be considered direct
benefits. Other jobs may be created through the expansion of the local
economy due to the existence of the major league sports team and the new
sports arena or stadium. However, a major consideration in regard to job
119 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 27, at 74.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 58. This figure is dependent on the number of non-city residents who attend and spend
money at the games. Id. at 69.
M Id. As one industry expert noted, the key to measuring a new sports facility's economic benefits
to the city is the assessment of the "spending increase associated with the stadium." Zimmerman, supra
note 77, at 13-14. This observation embodies the hope of many city officials that this type of economic
activity will help revitalize a city's downtown area. Downtown revitalization is another way in which to
measure the effectiveness of a sports facility as an economic impetus for the city. The success of such
revitalization projects, as well as the determination for indirect benefits, originate from the team and
facility's success in attracting tourists and in selling broadcasting and licensing rights to national firms.
Noll & Zimmerman, supra note 26, at 68. The more people and subsequent spending imported to the
area, the greater the actual economic impact of the new sports facility for the city. In this regard, a new
sports arena or stadium which hosts games in a regionally isolated team, like the Colorado Rockies
baseball team, is preferable because studies who that such a facility will attract fans from greater distances
than one in a saturated market like New England. Baade & Sanderson, supra note 35, at 95. This outside
interest creates the type of external spending which the aforementioned formula values in judging the
economic benefit of a new sports facility.
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growth is determining whether an increase in aggregate spending on city
goods and services must accompany, and indeed spur, this job creation.' 23
Economists view these direct and indirect benefits generated by the new
sports facility as spending that would not have occurred in the city but for the
existence of the new sports arena or stadium.'2 4 However, in determining
the effect of the direct and indirect benefits on the city, one must subtract
from that figure the concessions that may have been produced elsewhere, as
well as a significant portions of the salaries to players, executives, and facility
workers, many of whom live elsewhere and thus only spend a portion
locally.'2' This counterbalancing provides a realistic determination of how
the new sports facility brings additional economic benefits, if any at all, to a
city.
C. Sports Facility as the Best Possible Municipal Investment
Other economists claim that a new sports facility should not be judged
by the actual financial costs to the local government, but rather by opportunity
cost of the investment.2 6 Simply said, if the sports facility created greater
benefits than other investment options, either financially or in terms of social
service needs, than it would pass the opportunity cost test. However, if other
investments, such as unemployment insurance, schools, or parks are more
attractive choices, then these economists would consider the new sports
arena or stadium as an undesirable investment.
Under this rationale, public investment in a new sports arena or stadium
can be worthwhile in only three circumstances. First, society may have
unemployed resources that can be used most productively through
employment opportunities affiliated with the new sports facility. Second,
if the city is at full employment, it may be spending too little on investment
123 Baade & Sanderson, supra note 35, at 95. Moreover, the extent to whichjobs are created varies
with the degree to which the metropolitan or regional economy is operating near its productive capacity
and with the level of unemployment in the city. Some industry experts claim that if there are other
development projects which could, for example, employ the same construction workers that are building
the new sports facility, then those jobs should not be considered as newjob creation. lfthejobs created
by the new sports arena or stadium would merely displace jobs that another project would have provided
if it had been initiated, then the sports facility project cannot be credited with thesejobs. Id. at 94.
124 Antitrust Issues in Relocation of Professional Sports Franchises: Hearings: Hearings Before Subconn. on
Antitrust, Bus. Rights, and Competition of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciarty, 104th Cong. 117 (1995) (statement
of Robert A Baade).
12 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 27, at 68.
ax Id. at 60.
1-7 Id. at 60-2.
128 Id. at 62.
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in relation to current consumption. This underinvestment, however, will
only justify subsidizing a new sports facility if the capital markets do a poor
job at financing some form of viable private investments. 129 Finally, the
economic benefits derived from the new sports facility will have to exceed
those by other feasible investments. 13  If the investment in a new public
sports facility meets one of these three caveats, then, according to Noll and
Zimbalist, the project would be justifiable.
D. Other Evaluative Considerations
Two other factors play an important role in determining whether or not
new sports facilities are economically justifiable for cities. First, the
"occupancy rate" and hours of operation are extremely important to the role
that a new sports arena or stadium will play in spurring economic activity,
particularly in a city's downtown area. 13' The more calendar days a sports
arena or stadium hosts events, the more likely the facility will have a positive
effect on the local economy. In this regard, sports arenas that host basketball
or hockey teams or baseball stadiums are more viable municipal investments
than a stadium devoted to an NFL team because of the number of games that
the different sports teams will play in their respective facilities. Moreover,
the types of supplemental events that beget the generation of new net
economic gain for a city, such as concerts, political conventions, and trade
shows, are more conducive to these sports arenas than larger, often outdoor,
stadiums.
The other element which relates to the evaluation of the benefit ofa new
sports facility for a city is the use of the facility for both repetitive events,
such as regular season home games, and less frequent occurrences, like
playoff games, Super Bowls, and periodic political conventions.132 A balance
between these two types of events provide a constant and diversified
entertainment and activity base to draw a consistent and affluent crowd to the
sports facility and its surrounding commercial area. In terms of downtown
revitalization efforts and the goals of economic development for a local area
in general, ities aim for such a balance to help them justify their
expenditures on a new sports facility.
129 Id.
130 Id.
013 Baade & Sanderson, supra note 35, at 96.
132 Id.
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V. CRITICISMS AGAINST PUBLICLY FINANCED SPORTS FACILITIES
A. Introduction
Using the evaluative standards detailed above, many critics claim that a
new sports facility is a bad investment for a city. Opponents to such facilities
posit that the public financing of a new sports arena or stadium absorbs
scarce government funds that could be used for either tax reductions or
programs having a greater social or economic benefit. 33 Criticisms of new
sports facilities fall into four main categories: the uncertainty of revenue
forecasts, a major faulty assumption upon which the conclusion that the deal
is self-financed is based, sources of errors in the financial plans, and the new
sports facility as a poor investment.
B. Uncertainty of Revenue Forecasts
Financial deals for new sports facilities factor in a projected dollar
amount attributable to sales taxes, ticket taxes, and rent payments. This
anticipated sum is often used as evidence that the deal's investors, most often
the city or state government, will recoup its up-front expenditures.
However, these projected sources of revenue beget uncertainty, particularly
because their propriety relies heavily on the popularity of the team. For
example, if a financial plan assumes that a new sports arena or stadium will
cause a permanent, substantial increase in rent and tax collections - as most
deals often do - it is implicitly expecting the facility to generate a
nontransitory increase in attendance. As evidence shows, this is a dangerous
and often unfounded assumption to make.
Historical evidence demonstrates that attendance does increase after the
initial opening of a new sports facility.'TM However, after the fervor created
by the new stadium quells, attendance stabilizes and often decreases. As Noll
and Zimbalist point out, there is a way to counteract this phenomenon. With
better attendance comes greater revenue collections and thus improved
financial positions. 35  Team owners can then reinvest this money into
fielding better teams, which can then prolong the attendance boom. A
problem, however, arises if all teams were to build new sports facilities. This
133 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 27, at 55.
134 Id. at 16. The novelty effect of a new sports arena or stadium, as shown in Jacobs Field in
Cleveland and Coors Field in Denver, increases attendance for what critics call the "honeymoon period."
135 Id.
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hypothetical raises an important issue. All teams cannot win games and
thereby all increase their attendance.'36 The system of attendance boosting
relies upon a team's success at the expense of other team's success and thus
popularity. Therefore, as other sports arenas and stadiums open and other
teams improve, attendance and revenue for teams with previously new sports
facilities will gradually decline. 137  This likely occurrence, experts predict,
will have two significant effects. First, due to this inevitable decline, the pro-
jected dollar amounts from sales taxes, ticket taxes, and rent payments that
increase over the lifetime of the new sports facility will be inaccurate and
mislead city officials and ultimately the taxpayers, the true investors in such
financing deals. 3 ' Second, since this attendance effect is cyclical, after twenty
or thirty years, if not sooner, teams will most likely seek new sports facilities
to reinvigorate the attendance and thus revenue boom associated with the
opening of a new sports arena or stadium.'39 A more realistic revenue
estimation in these financial plans, Noll and Zimbalist posit, would exhibit
an initial increase, but then a general decline in revenues associated with the
new sports facility."4
C. A Major Faulty Assumption: A Self-Financing Deal
Almost all new sports facility financial deals conclude that the new sports
arena or stadium will be completely self-financed and will cost taxpayers
nothing after reimbursement revenue is collected from the sources
previously detailed in Part II. However, these same plans make the same
faulty assumption in making their revenue projections which lead to this
assertion: that the site upon which the new sports facility will be built has a
zero opportunity cost and would have housed no other development project
had the new sports arena or stadium not been built."' These financial plans
attribute no value or worth to the site, usually owned by the city or state, and
thus provides an inaccurate starting point in determining the costs and
benefits to both the team and the government. This faulty assumption, then,
does not attribute the benefit of this site to the team - and thus a cost for the
city or state - nor does it juxtapose the value of this investment as opposed
to other possible projects which could have been undertaken on the same
' ld. at 17.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
,10 Id.
141 Id. This misrepresentation becomes especially significant in evaluating a new sports facility
as the best possible investment opportunity for a municipality. See text accompanying infra notes 168-71.
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site. Critics such as Noll and Zimbalist claim that this faulty assumption -
ignoring or excluding such information and considerations - conveys a
misperception that these deals are self-financed.
D. Sources of Errors in the Financial Plans
1. OVERVIEW
New sports facility proponents often claim that revenue generated from
rent, taxes, and the other sources mentioned in Part II, will be sufficient to
cover a city's expenditures. However, independent scholarship has
concluded that studies that claim substantial economic contributions to local
and regional economies from sports teams and new facilities have
systematically exaggerated their real contribution.'42 When a new sports
facility is proposed in a city, the city and the team contract consulting firms
to determine what the effect of the team and new facility will be. These
firms often conclude that the sports team and its new facility will produce
substantial, positive economic impacts for the city." 3 Yet, their analyses are
often fraught with significant methodological problems. First, these studies
often overstate the extent to which the new sports facility attracts tourists and
people who do not live within city limits.'" Second, these studies also
confuse new spending with spending that is diverted from other local
entertainment activities.
41
142 See Robert A. Baade and Allen R. Sanderson, Cities Under Siege: How the Changing Financial
Structure of Professional Sports is Putting Cities at Risk and What to Do About It, in 2 ADVANCES IN THE
ECONOMICS OF SPORTS 77-114 (Wallace Hendricks, ed. 1997); Mark S. Rosentraub, et al., Sport and
Domntmown Development Stratgyf If You Build It, WiUlJobs Come?, 16J. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, 228-39 (1994).
Part of the reason for advancement of the illusion that a new sports facility provides great public benefit
may come from the lopsided advertising spending in this debate. In San Francisco, proponents of the new
stadium outspent their opponents at a ratio of twenty-five to one, while in Seattle, advocates for the new
baseball stadium for the MLB's Mariners outspent their opponents at a ratio of more than twenty to one.
Phillip J. Trounstine & Brandon Bailey, Stratey: Funds, Fees, Foot Soldiers Combined to Give 49ers Win in
Overtime, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 5, 1997, at A20; Carlo Caraccioloi, Plenty Share Blame for the
Stadium Debacle, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 28, 1997, at AS.
143 Keating, supra note 12, at 1. Of interest is the fact that these same studies often exclude or
ignore some of the natural downsides of these new sports facilities, such as an increase in local congestion,
pollution, as well as in the local crime rate. Noll & Zimbalist,supra note 27, at 67. These effects add extra
costs to the city which, ironically, for which these economic impact studies do not account.
14 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 27, at 68.
'45 Id. at 496.
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2. OVERSTATING THE SPORTS TEAM'S ABILITY TO ATTRACT
NONRESIDENTS
These commissioned economic impact studies often attribute all
spending by out-of-town visitors to the team and its new sports 'facility
regardless of the motive for their visit or whether or not they attended a
game.'" Part of the problem with determining an accurate figure for this
consideration is that ticket sales are rarely made public, and therefore these
consulting firms find it difficult to know how many nonresidents attended
a particular game. More importantly, though, the significance of sports
teams and facilities attracting tourism, according to some experts, is
declining.'47 Until recently, sports teams used to be primarily concentrated
in two main areas: California and New England. However, major league
sports have been expanding to smaller markets.1 8 The result is that a higher
fraction of the population now has a local team and thus tourists have less of
an impetus to attend a major league sporting event in a different city.149
Therefore, the extent to which these economic impact studies overestimate
the effects of a sports team and its new facility can skew the objective
determination of the strength of the financial deal for the city.
3. CONFUSING NEW SPENDING WITH DIVERTED ENTERTAINMENT
SPENDING
These economic impact studies also attribute the spending on the
sporting events and associated businesses as "new" money to the city. The
most obvious error in such an assertion arises in the case of a new sports
facility replacing an old one in the same city. A new replacement facility, as
economists Robert A. Baade and Allen R. Sanderson point out, does not lead
to the expansion of the local economy, but rather maintains economic
activity at or near its former level.'" Therefore, such facilities do not
generate any "new" revenue, as many of these economic impact studies
assert, but cost hundreds of millions to maintain a certain level of economic
activity related to sporting events.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 70.
148 See text accompanying supra note 11.
149 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 27, at 70. Therefore, a larger percent of attendance now comes
from local residents in the form of season ticket sales.
150 Baade & Sanderson, supra note 35, at 95.
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Moreover, many economists point out that money spent on sports would
have otherwise been spent on other leisure and entertainment activities.'51
While construction workers and fans who live outside the area of the sports
facility increase the patronage to bars, restaurants and parking lots in the area,
this activity is merely a substitution for economic activity in another part of
the city. This substitution effect, therefore, does not create any new net
income for the city and its businesses that would not have existed but for the
presence of the sports team and its facility.
One of the few economic impact reports which actually acknowledged
this fact stated:
Adjustments must also be made to direct spending to reflect the fact
that much of the economic activity associated with the Colts would
likely impact the area economy in another form had the NFL game
no taken place.., an individual attending an NFL game at the RCA
Dome may instead go to a movie had the Colt's franchise not hosted
a game.1
52
Therefore, to present such revenue as unique or new money for the city,
according to the aforementioned experts, would be disingenuous and
inaccurate in calculating the effects, namely the benefits, of the sports team
and its new facility on the local area.
E. New Sports Facilities as Poor Investments
1. BAD AS PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
Experts agree that new sports facilities are rarely the best possible
investment option for a city. 5 3 One reason for this view is that new sports
arenas or stadiums are rarely seen as attractive private investments,
particularly for two reasons. First, new sports facilities do not generate
enough revenue to improve the profitability of the team and pay for itself i"
Second, if a new sports facility. were not subsidized, the interest and
amortization for the new sports arena or stadium would be approximately
151 Baade & Sanderson, supra note 35, at 96.
152 COOPERS & LYBRAND, ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE INDIANAPOLIS
COLTS, AREPORTPREPAREDrFORTHECAPITALIMPROVEMENTBOARD, COUNTYOF MARION (INDIANA)
3 (May 30, 1996).
153 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 28.
15 Id. Due to this situation, governments, in most cases, find it difficult to find a combination
of rents, fees, taxes, and other revenue to pay for a new sports facility.
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10% of the construction costs, including site acquisition and clearance.' 5
This debt payment would be too expensive for any private investor, namely
a sports team, to afford with the anticipation of making the investment
profitable.
No individual sport would generate the incremental revenue kept by a
team to be sufficient to pay for a new sports facility, except for in two
potential scenarios. First, a dual-purpose basketball and hockey facility could
conceivably pay for itself.'" In the sports, game revenues are not shared;
therefore, the home team keeps this revenue. Moreover, such a facility can
be used for other events like trade shows, circuses, and concerts. The second
potentially viable option is that of an expansion team.'5 7 Since baseline
revenues for an expansion team are zero, the revenues gained by the new
sports arena or stadium are entirely a gain to the team.
2. DowNrowN REvIrrALIZATION
Proponents of new sports facilities claim that new businesses are more
likely to relocate to a city with a major league sports franchise. However,
critics do not raise the issue of whether sports teams make a city more
attractive for corporate executives. Rather, they question whether or not the
most effective way to spend $200 million or more with the goal of attracting
new businesses is to build a new sports facility with which to attract a new
major league sports team.'5 8 However, this question relates to a bigger issue
of new sports facility investments as an impetus for downtown revitalization.
The systematic decline to decentralization of economic activity and
suburbanization of urban life is well documented.'" Many cities, like
Baltimore, Phoenix, and St. Louis, have built new sports facilities in their
respective downtown areas in hopes of retarding, if not reversing, such
trends."W These cities hope that people attending games will purchase goods
and service and thus bring economic prosperity to their respective downtown
areas. However, in contrast to cities that did not build downtown sports
facilities, the experience of cities with these assets is not encouraging. For
example, from 1985-1995, the population in cities that built new sports
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 73.
'5 Konrad Stahl, Theories of Urban Business Location, in, 2 HANDBOOK OF REGIONALAND URBAN
ECONOMICS, 759-820 (Edwin S. Mills, ed. 1987); Mahlon Straszheim, The 7iory of Urban Residential
Location, in 2 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS, supra, at 717-58.
160 DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, TAx-ExEmrPr BONDS AND THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS STADIUMS 15 (1996).
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facilities declined more than those which did not.'6' Moreover, both types
of cities also experienced the same decrease in job levels during this period. 62
In addition, new sports facilities have not historically provided a
resurgence in local economic activity. Research of approximately fifty cities
and their activities for the past thirty-five years demonstrates that local
communities are not likely to benefit perceptibly from the construction and
existence of a new sports facility. 63 In fact, such efforts often yield little, if
any, profits. For example, Phoenix is getting between a 1-2% return rate on
the $253 million taxpayer investment in Bank One Ballpark.' 4 Moreover,
experts posit that, in most cases, sports teams and facilities produce a very
small scale of economic activity and therefore cannot reverse the
aforementioned decentralization of residential and business activity that
plagues most cities' downtown areas. 6' Therefore, because new sports
facilities, for the most part, have little success in revitalizing a city's
downtown area or generating new profits in this region, critics condemn the
downtown revitalization investment model of using a new sports facility to
spur economic growth.
3. INEFFICIENTJOB CREATION
While advocates of new sports facilities point to job creation as an
attribute to the public investment, evidence exists that creating jobs in this
manner is actually inefficient and costly. For example, although Bank One
Ballpark in Arizona created four hundred new jobs, the project cost $280
million, averaging $700,000 per job.' 66 Critics point out the obvious: This
return on such an investment is quite expensive. Moreover, to aggravate this
situation, economic impact studies tend to overestimate the number ofjobs
161 Rosentraub, supra note 32, at 205.
162 Id. Indianapolis had a slightly different experience that other cities with new sports facilities.
While other similarly-situated cities experiencedjob decreases of 27.7% during the decade spanning 1985-
1995, Indianapolis only experienced a 26.6% decline. Stahl, supra note 159, at 772. Two reasons may
explain this phenomenon. First, Indianapolis focused on amateur sporting events rather than strictly on
professional sports. Second, the city balanced their urban redevelopment plan with more than merely a
new sports facility. Nevertheless, even Indianapolis, with its alternative model of downtown
revitalization, could only modestly retard the effects ofsuburbanization.
163 Robert Baade & Alan Sanderson, Field of Fantasies, INTELLECTUAL AMMUNITION, MarjApr.
1996, at 1.
164 Baade, supra note 124, at 117.
165 Robert A. Baade, Professional Sports as Catalysts for Metropolitan Economic Development, 18J. OF
URBAN AFFAIRS, 1-17 (1996); Mark S. Rosentraub, Does the Emperor Have New Clothes? A Reply to Robert
Baade, 18J. OF URBAN AFFAIRS, 23-31 (1996). For examples of successful downtown revitalization efforts
featuring a new sports facility, see text accompanying infra notes 202-29.
166 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 498.
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that will be created. For example, in Jacksonville, the team asserted that it
would create three thousand newjobs. 67 However, a report later adjusted
this number to approximately one tenth of the previous estimate."6
Furthermore, sports facility investments reap fewerjobs than other types
of public investments. An example of this arises in Maryland. The Maryland
Department of Business and Economic Development estimated that the new
football stadiums for the Baltimore Ravens would create 1,394 new jobs at
a cost of $127,000 perjob 69 However, Maryland's Sunny Day Fund created
or retained 5,200 jobs, costing taxpayers just $6,250 per job, ° As this
example shows, other types ofpublic investments can create more jobs at less
of a cost than investing in a new public sports facility.
Moreover, the types ofjobs that new sports facilities create tend to be
low-wage, part-time, and seasonal. 7' As economist Andrew Zimbalist points
out, sports teams employ between fifty and one hundred and twenty full-
time employees, along with several hundred low-skill and low-wage part-
time and temporary jobs. 72 With the majority of the jobs created by new
sports facilities being low-wage and part-time, critics lambaste such an option
as ineffective for true job creation and economic growth. To this same end,
these facts help explain why sports teams and new facilities do not induce the
same magnitude of economic activity as other types of public investments.
167 Erie Norton, Football at Any Cost: One City's Mad Chasefor an NFL Franchise, WALL ST. J., Oct.
13, 1993, atAl.
16 Baade,supra note 165, at 17. Such job creation figures often stem from excessive optimism that
increased sports generated revenues necessarily correspond to an expansion of the local economy. See
Baade & Sanderson, supra note 35, at 93. However, the demand for labor derives from the demand for
goods and services. Ifa new sports facility does not correlate with an increase in new net spending, new
jobs will not be created. See text accompanying supra notes 123-25.
169 Zimmerman, supra note 78, at 122. Note that economically inefficient public subsidies forjob
creation are not limited to sports facility. Local and state governments subsidize many private businesses
in order to spur job growth in a particular area. For example, the State of Alabama bid $300 million in
1993 to secure the first Mercedes-Benz AG auto plant in the United States. This public investment was
projected to create 1,500jobs, translating to $200,000 per job created. However, more recent analyses
have concluded that the new plant has created less than 1,000jobs. Baade & Sanderson, supra note 35, at
101. This type of government subsidy was equally, if not more, economically inefficient in terms ofjob
creation than the football stadium in Baltimore.
170 Zimmerman, supra note 78, at 123.
171 An Analysis of Trends in the Marketfor Professional Sports Teams and Stadiums; Separating Myth From
Reality, Before the SenateJudiciary Comm., 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Robert A Baade).
'r Antitrust Implications ofSports Franchise Relocation: Hearings on Professional Sports Franchise Relocation-
Antitrust Implications Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (written testimony of
Andrew Zimbalist) at 5.
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4. BETTER INVESTMENT OPTIONS
With all of the rhetoric about the economic benefits of a new sports
facility, a leading expert points out that major league sports teams represent
a very small portion of the economies of the cities in which they are
located. 73 However, the tax expenditures for a new sports facility often
represent a significant portion of city and state budgets.74 In addition, in
terms of determining the best possible investment option for a city, many
critics of new sports facilities argue for a public consumption approach to
evaluate such deals. 75 In this regard, a new sports facility would be judged
against a new park, zoo, or school in terms of deciding whether or not this
new sports arena or stadium is the best possible investment - both
economically and socially - for the city. Several studies indicate that cities
could benefit more through other investment and development options.1
76
As economist Dennis Zimmerman pointed out, "[tihere are a lot more
productive things that state and local governments could have done with this
money."' 77 Moreover, from a "public consumption" standpoint, critics of
new sports facilities point out that ticket prices for major league sporting
events have risen to the point where many local residents cannot afford to
take advantage of the new facility. 71 In this regard, a new sports facility
would provide access to fewer people in the city than a park or a school.
Therefore critics decry new sports facilities as inefficient public investments
that fail to offer more attractive benefits than socially integral projects.
F. Examples of Bad Sports Facility Investment Deals
1. OVERVIEW
The Edward Jones Dome in St. Louis and the unsuccessful proposed
football stadium for the New England Patriots in Hartford provide two
examples of new sports facilities that are or would have been bad investments
173 Zimbalist, supra note 22. New sports facilities also have a minimal effect on the number of new
jobs created in the city. See text accompanying supra notes 166-72.
174 Id.
175 JayWeiner, Professional Sports'True Value is Not Economic, STARTRIBUNE, Oct. 22,1995, at C 1.
176 Leslie Wayne, Picking Up the Tab for Fields of Drearns; Taxpayers Build Stadium; Owners Cash In,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1996, at 39.
177 Id.
178 Safir, supra note 26, at 954.
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for their respective cities.'79 In St. Louis, the three levels of government
involved in the deal with the Rams do not collect enough yearly or up-front
revenue from the team or other sources to cover their debt payments. From
an investment standpoint, this financial deal could not generate enough
revenue to cover its expenses, much less create new revenue for the city. In
both cases, the respective government authorities do not or would not
receive a break-even investment, much less an economic boom for their
cities. On the other hand, the major league sports teams involved receive or
would have received significant amounts of money from various sources of
revenue, ones that in similar deals in other cities are shared with the host city.
2. THE EDWARDJONES DOME iN ST. Louis
The $258 million Edward Jones Dome was financed before St. Louis
even secured a major league sports team to play in it.18 ° The stadium was
wholly financed by a series of bonds issued by the State of Missouri, the
County of St. Louis, and the City ofSt. Louis.'8' However, the governments'
financial obligation did not end there. The three levels of government also
committed to pay $4 million a year over a thirty-year period to the stadium's
"Asset Preservation Fund."8 2 The total governmental obligation, then, for
the construction of the stadium plus the over thirty-year life of the
supplemental financial agreement, reaches $720 million dollars."8
With such a hefty financial commitment, the city might hope to recoup
some of its expenditures through one of the revenue generating sources
detailed in Part III. However, the revenue-sharing facet of the financial
agreement between the three governments and the Rams is lopsided in favor
of the team. The agreement provides for the Rams to receive all $74 million
generated by the sale of PSLs, 100% of the revenue generated by the dome's
122 suites and 6,200 club seats, and 75% of the stadium's advertising
17 There are just two of the many sports facility investment deals which are unfavorable to their
respective host cities. Others include the Bank One Ballpark in Phoenix and the Oakland Alameda
Coliseum (renovated in 1996).
18D Reilly, supra note 29, at B1. The city eventually reached an agreement with the then Los
Angeles Rams to relocate to St. Louis and play in the new stadium.
181 St. Louis Regional Convention and Sports Complex Authority, A History of the Dome, ST.
LoUIS-POST DISPATCH, Nov. 5, 1996 at 16. The state issued fifty percent of the bonds, while the county
and city each issued twenty-five percent.
182 Id.
183 Debt payments of $20 million a year for thirty years equals $600 million. The $4 million
contribution a year for thirty years to the "Asset Preservation Fund" equals $120 million. $600 million
plus $120 million equals $720 million for the thirty year period.
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revenue.'84 The city, county, and state governments, on the other hand, only
collectively receive $250,000 in annual rent, an estimated $1 million in
annual admission taxes, and 25% of the stadium's advertising revenue.85
This deal provides tremendous financial benefits for the Rams, enabling
them to maximize profits and thus improve the worth of the franchise. Such
profitability has allowed the Rams to increase their payroll and thus improve
the team - with the team playing in the Super Bowl in 2000 and 2002.
However, the deal costs the taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars, while
providing a minuscule amount of return revenue which does not even
constitute 10% of the governments' yearly expenditures on the new stadium.
In this case, despite the success of the Rams, the Edward Jones Dome in St.
Louis was clearly a bad investment for the taxpayers.
3. THE HARTFORD FOOTBALL STADIUM
a. Introduction
Even though the unsuccessful proposed football stadium in Hartford for
the New England Patriots was part of a more than one billion dollar
redevelopment project seeking to revitalize Hartford's downtown area, the
deal presented a bad investment for the State of Connecticut. Stadium
supporters claimed that the project would be "revenue neutral," but an
analysis of the proposed financial deal between Robert Kraft, the owner of
the Patriots, and the State of Connecticut, refuted this assertion." Under
the proposed agreement, the Patriots would have grossed more than $90
million from the stadium. However, the stadium would not have received
up-front funding from the team. Moreover, the state would also have paid
Kraft additional money above and beyond the cost of the stadium if the
franchise did not gross certain anticipated revenue from special seat licenses.
The agreement also did not account for extra infrastructure costs which that
would have likely stemmed from the stadium and for which the state would
have had to pay. Therefore, the proposed agreement offered tremendous
184 Josh Gotthelf, Rams' Frontiere, Shaw Scratching Carnahan's Back, ST. Louis Bus.J., Feb. 1, 1996,
at Al.
1m5 Louis J. Rose, Golden Lease If NFL OKs Rams' Move, Club Can Expect Nearly Double Money
Coming From the Gates Alone, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 12, 1995, at B1.
186 Christopher Keating, Lawmakers Prepare to Crunch Numbers on Stadium Proposal, HARTFORD
COURANT, Nov. 21,1998, at Al. See also Stephen Ohlemacher& Dan Haar, Taxpayers'Bill $257 Million?,
HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 10, 1998, at 1 (citing a report by the State of Connecticut General
Assembly's Office ofFiscal Analysis that concluded that the proposed football stadium would have created
a $257 million deficit for the State).
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benefits for the Patriots, while presenting the state with only minimal
potential gains, with the likelihood of significant financial debt related to the
stadium.
b. Collecting Insufficient Revenue to Pay for the Yearly Debt
Under the proposed agreement, the state would have paid for the entire
$375 million stadium project, including infrastructure improvements and
parking.117 Over a thirty year period, the state's yearly debt payment would
have been $25 million.' 8 The problem with this enormous debt payment is
that the state did not anticipate initially generating enough revenue from the
stadium to cover this financial obligation. To help finance the deal, the state
expected to collect $15.6 million in annual revenue from the operation of the
stadium and various revenue attributable to the stadium.'89 The state
claimed, however, that while at first the direct tax revenues generated by the
stadium would have only covered half of the annual debt payments, over the
thirty year life of the deal, these revenues would have more than paid for the
cost. 190 Yet, as detailed in Part V, economic impact studies often overestimate
the attendance-generated revenue because these studies do not account for
the natural drop in attendance that occurs over the life of a stadium. 9'
Therefore, while an independent study by KPMG Peat Marwick estimated
187 Gregg Krupa, Major Conn. Firms Cool on Buying Pats Luxury Boxes: Sales ofPrenium Seating a Key
to Financing of $280M Stadium Deal, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 1998, at A76.
188 Id.
189 Id. The in-stadium revenue would have come largely from a 10% ticket tax. The high-end
seating would have generated $4.5 million, while the general seating would have garnered the state $2.7
million a year. The state would have also received revenue from sales tax on concessions, novelties sold
in the stadium, parking at the stadium, and stadium advertising. These different revenue sources would
have garnered the state $15.6 million in the initial years, with a projected 6% increase per year. However,
the state would have also received revenue not accounted for in the stadium's financial deal throtgh the
University of Connecticut football team games, international soccer matches, concerts, and tax revenues
from new restaurants, hotels, and parking lots. Cassidy, supra note 3, at Al. See also Roger Catlin, Netv
Stadium Could Be Big Concerts' Home Too, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 21, 1998, at A10 (detailing the
potential revenue created by concerts which otherwise would most likely go to a venue outside of
Connecticut). Nevertheless, all of this revenue would most likely still have fallen short of covering the
state's cost until more than a decade into the life of the stadium.
190 Christopher Keating & Matthew Daley, Study: Hartford Just Right for NFL Team, HARTFORD
COURANT, Dec. 2, 1998, at Al (citing an independent study concluded by KPMG Peat Marwick which
reported that the state would have made a $3.2 million total profit over the thirty year life of the stadium).
The study also notes that the stadium would have helped to generate local economic activity sufficient
to create 2,700 new private-sector jobs within the first year and 3,200 within the first five years of the
stadium's existence.
191 See text accompanying supra notes 134-40.
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that the stadium would have grossed $3.2 million in total profits for the
thirty year life of the stadium, experts posit that the projections are based on
inflated, unrealistic numbers. Ifthis history of overestimation applied to the
Hartford stadium, then the state would have never been able to cover its
expenditures on the investment. Moreover, even if stadium-related revenue
would have increased at a projected 6% per year, the state would have faced
a deficit in the yearly debt payment until the twelfth year of the projected life
of the stadium.' 92 This situation provided great financial burdens on the state
balanced only by the unfounded hope that the revenue generation would
have continued to increase by 6% over the life of the stadium and thus finally
show a profit for the state to compensate for said initial deficits.
c. The Premium Seating Guarantee: A Potential Loss for the State
The state also faced another potential financial loss. The proposed
stadium deal allocated all revenue generated by the sale of the facility's
premium seating options to the team.' 93 A provision in the deal guaranteed
the Patriots the total potential generated revenue from these seating options.
If the luxury suites and club seats did not sell-out entirely, the state would
have been forced to pay the Patriots up to $17.5 million dollars a year for this
guaranteed subsidy. 4 What was possibly most troubling about this situation
was that preliminary indications pointed to the likelihood that the stadium
would not have sold all of these special seating options.'9 5 Without
significant support from corporate Connecticut, the state and the taxpayers
would have had to cover an additional financial burden for the stadium, the
only sports facility proposed for the NFL that included taxpayer money for
' Cassidy, supra note 3, at Al. The State was considering using $100 million from its 1997-98
fiscal year surplus as a down payment for the proposed stadium. This would have lessened the State's
yearly debt service payment and increased the likelihood that the State would have covered its
expenditures and possibly made money off of the investment over the life of the stadium. Christopher
Keating & Matthew Daly, New Numbers Mean Quicker Prfits, Officials Say, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec.
11, 1998, at I (citing new projections from GovernorJohn G. Rowland and other Connecticut legislators
that estimated a $260 million savings over a thirty year period if the State used the $100 million as a down
payment).
19 Daly, supra note 192, at Al. The luxury suites - priced at $100,000 apiece and thus ranking
them among the most expensive in the country - would have earned $12.5 million a year if they were all
leased. Likewise, if all leased, the club seats would have generated $30 million a year.
194 Mike Swift & Tom Puleo, Suite Success Key To Stadium: Stadium Package a Suite Deal If Corporate
Sponsors Don't Fill Luxury Suites, State Pays Krafi the Difference, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 24, 1998, at
Al.
'95 Krupa, supra note 187, at A76. Interviews conducted by the HARTFORD COURANT with more
than a dozen of Connecticut's top companies revealed little immediate interest in the luxury suites. In
fact, as of November 26, 1998, only two of the luxury suites had received preliminary commitments.
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the purchase of luxury boxes and club seats. Therefore, the state, in addition
to the $25 million yearly debt payments, may have had to subsidize special
seating options for a Patriots team which would have spent nothing on the
construction or maintenance of the stadium.
d. The Related Expenses Left Unaccounted for in the Agreement
Finally, the financial plan did not account for the added expense and
strain the new stadium and subsequent downtown redevelopment projects
would have had on Hartford municipal services such as traffic control, fire
and police protection, and litter clean-up. 196 Moreover, other expensive
infrastructure considerations might have also arisen. For example, the state's
Capital City Economic Development Authority had begun planning a $65
million program to add another five thousand parking spaces to
accommodate the influx of fans and shoppers to the revitalized downtown
area. 97 In addition, the Patriots might have asked the state or the city to
develop a mass transit system in downtown Hartford. 9 ' Therefore, there
might have been substantial extra costs to the city and state that were not
accounted for in the financial deal. These added expenses increased the
amount of necessary stadium-generated revenue that the state would have
had to raise in order to at the very least meet its debt payments, if not profit
from the stadium.
e. Conclusion
The Patriots' owner sought to keep the team in Massachusetts and was
willing to pay $200 million to build a new stadium there.Y Yet, instead of
striking a deal that was beneficial to both the state and the Patriots, the State
of Connecticut entered into an initial deal with the Patriots that imposed
heavy financial burdens. On the other hand, the aforementioned
independent study conservatively estimated that the stadium would have
generated more than $90 million in gross revenue for the Patriots. 2°° In fact,
' Tom Puleo & Carolyn Moreau, Patriots' Relocation No Freebie for City Stadium Would Demand
Police, Fire Services, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 25, 1998, at Al.
197 Mike Swift & Tom Puleo, Now City Needs Game Plan Planners Scrounge Parking Places to Prevent
Football Fan Gridlock, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 21, 1998, at Al.
'9 Id.
199 Condon, supra note 14, at A3.
M0 Mike Swift, The $100 Million Man?: Stadium Deal Would Make Kt's Patriots One of the League's
Riches Franchises, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 2, 1998, at Al. Revenue will be generated from general
admission ticket sales; the sale of luxury suites and club seats; concessions, parking, advertising, and in-
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several economists in this field say that the proposed stadium deal appeared
to be among the most lucrative ever made by a government to an NFL
owner. 20 ' The benefits reaped from this deal would have made the Patriots
the fourth most valuable franchise in the NFL.
These benefits for the franchise hold even further importance when one
realizes how one-sided the deal was. The Patriots would not have
contributed any up-front money to the deal, but rather would have reaped
the aforementioned benefits through various revenue sources. The Patriots'
sole financial obligation detailed in this agreement was the cost of operating
the stadium. The state, on the other hand, had only the hope that the
optimistic in-stadium revenue projections would have come to fruition and
thus paid for the extensive costs of the stadium. However, this occurrence
did not seem likely. Instead, the state would likely have fallen significantly
short of its debt payment for at least the first ten years of the stadium. Also,
the state may have had to subsidize the Patriots for the special seating options
which went unsold each year. Finally, extra infrastructure costs would have
added to the state's already hefty financial burden. Given that the stadium
would have been wholly funded by the state, and that the financial deal
almost ensured the state of lingering debt for more than a decade to come,
if it became profitable or self-sustaining at all, this proposed stadium was
clearly a bad investment for the State of Connecticut and its taxpayers.
VI. SUCCESSFUL SPORTS FACILITY INVESTMENTS
A. Overview
While many experts of sports facility financing claim that municipal
sports arenas and stadiums are bad economic deals for cities, two new sports
facilities have transcended this conventional rule: Baltimore's CamdenYards
Baseball Park and Jacobs Field in Cleveland.2" These two sports facilities
share three attributes in common which lead experts to praise these
endeavors as worth investments for municipalities. First, both financial deals
provide for a fair split of stadium revenues to enable the city to cover its debt
payments and for the team to improve its profits and thus the worth of the
franchise. Second, in each city, the new sports facility has been successful in
stadium merchandise; and stadium naming rights.
0 Smith and Puleo, supra note 197, at Al.
e One caveat to bear in mind with the forthcoming analyses is that both stadiums have been open
for only a short period oftime, less than ten years in both cases. Therefore, the benefits of these stadiums
may fall susceptible to the "honeymoon effect" in attendance that new sports facilities experience. See text
accompanying supra notes 146-49.
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spurring economic growth and creating new jobs. Finally, both cities have
been successful in revitalizing their respective downtown areas through the
development of the new stadium and other projects.
B. Baltimore's Camden Yards Baseball Park
The $200 million baseball stadium for the Baltimore Orioles was built
and financed by the Maryland Stadium Authority (MSA). While financial
deals where the local or state government provides all of the up-front
expenditures are often considered by critics to be undesirable, the MSA
structured a deal that allows for the ballpark to be profitable for the city. The
MSA receives revenue from a number of different sources to cover its debt
payment and overhead. The Orioles pay $6 million a year in rent. 03 The
MSA also receives $5 million in the form of incremental admission tax
receipts. 204 Extra revenue is also created through the 10% of luxury suite
rentals, signage, and club seat revenues which the MSA receives. 205 The
MSA's debt payment and overhead total $20 million a year.20 However, the
aforementioned revenue, plus revenue gained from parking and new taxes
generated from new economic growth in the area, help the MSA meet their
financial obligations. Moreover, the real internal rate of return on the
stadium is 7.75%, a significant figure considering that Phoenix's rate of
return on its new baseball stadium is between 1-2%.207
A key to the MSA's ability to meet its yearly financial responsibilities is
the expansion of the Baltimore economy because of the new sports facility.
Average attendance during the last five years has grown from 29,458 to
45,034.08 This increase in the number of people attending games and
subsequently spending money in the downtown Baltimore area has spurred
economic growth. In fact, the out-of-state expenditures have translated into
five hundred and seventy-five newjobs for the Baltimore downtown area. °9
This economic prosperity is due, in large part, to the new sports facility and
the Orioles has helped Baltimore with its downtown resurgence.
M3 Bruce W. Hamilton & Peter Kahn, Baltimore's Camden Yards, in SPORTS,JOBs, & TAXES: THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPoRTs TEAMS AND STADIUMS, supra note 1, at 259.
Id. The admissions tax is 10% of the overall gate receipts.
- Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 31.
Wo6 Hamilton & Kahn, supra note 203, at 257.
W Id. at 258; Baade, supra note 124, at 117.
M Hamilton & Kahn, supra note 203, at 245. Forty-six percent of fans attending Baltimore
Orioles' games reside outside of Baltimore, while 31%--included in this 46/-actually live outside of
the state. As mentioned in Part III, the influx of fans from outside of the metropolitan area create new
net revenue to the city, both in terms of income for businesses and taxes for the city.
10 Id. at 257.
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In addition, the stadium financial deal is equally as favorable to the
Orioles. The total stadium revenue, most of which the Orioles keep, has
increased by approximately $25.5 million.21' This new revenue increases the
value of the Orioles' franchise and allows the Orioles to do what they could
not do at their former home, Memorial Stadium: spend competitively on
their team. In fact, since their move to Camden Yards, the payroll for the
Orioles' roster has risen approximately the same as their net revenue
increase, $22 million.2 11 These benefits all come at the cost to the Orioles of
only $6 million in rent and 10% of in-stadium revenues.
Therefore, as experts point out, the new Camden Yards baseball stadium
has produced the proverbial win-win situation. The revenue generated, both
inside and outside the stadium, allows the MSA to cover its expenses while
also enabling the Orioles to increase their profits and the value of their
franchise. Moreover, the new sports facility has revitalized Baltimore's
downtown through new net economic benefits.
C. Cleveland's Gatevay Project
1. INTRODUCTION
Approximately a decade ago, downtown Cleveland was a ponderous relic
with a decaying and dying core.212 However, the building of two new sports
facilities - Gund Arena, home of the Cleveland Cavaliers, and Jacobs Field,
which hosts the Cleveland Indians - coupled with other development
projects, has rejuvenated downtown Cleveland. These sports facilities are the
crown jewels of the downtown revitalization project, spurring significant
new economic activity in the city. Moreover, experts have hailed both the
financial deals as successes because the two sports facilities provide benefits
for both the teams and the city.
210 Id. Gate receipts increased by $13.2 million over the first four years of the stadium. Stadium
revenues, which include seventy-two luxury boxes, club seats, and signage, increased by an average of
$12.3 million over the same period of time.
211 Id. at 259.
212 Ziona Austrian & Mark S. Rosentraub, Cleveland's Gateway to the Future, in SPORTS, JOBS, &
TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS, supra note 1, at 355.
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2. PUBLIC AND PRiVATE FINANCING: BENEFITS FOR BOTH SIDES
The Gateway Project provided for both public and private financing for
the two new sports facilities. While the initial estimate for the cost of the two
facilities was $343.5 million, the final cost totaled $467 million.213 However,
even with this significant price tag for the project, the teams and the city
found a balanced financing agreement.214  The total private investment
totaled $174 million dollars and came from sources such as sales from the
luxury seats, a donation from a non-profit business organization supported
by the city's leading businesses called Cleveland Tomorrow, property loans,
and interest earnings. Also, to help cover the escalating costs of the
construction, the Indians spent an additional $20 million on the project.215
The city paid the difference between the private investment and the costs
of the Gateway Project through the issuance of bonds.216 The city will pay
the debt service through two sources: revenues generated from a "sin tax"
and through innovative rental agreements with the teams. 2 '7  The rental
agreements for both the Indians and the Cavaliers provide additional revenue
bases for the city that are directly tied to attendance.218 The rent paid by the
Cavaliers comes in three forms. First, the city receives 27.5% of the luxury
suite revenue.219 Second, the city garners 48% of the club seat revenue.2
Finally, the city receives seventy-five cents per ticket in excess of 1.85 and 2.5
million tickets, and one dollar per ticket in excess of 2.5 million tickets.22'
This ticket revenue garnered by the city is estimated at $1.175 million per
year through the year 2004.222 The rent paid by the Indians comes only in
the form of revenue generated by ticket sales. The city receives seventy-five
23 Id. at 360-62. The goals of the Gateway Project were three-fold. First, the city sought to retain
the Indians, who were threatening to leave. Second, the city wanted to bring the Cavaliers back to the
downtown area. Finally, Cleveland's political and business leaders hoped that the presence of the two
teams and the new facilities would lead to more growth of the city's downtown area. Id. at 358.
214 At first there were disagreements between the two parties regarding paying the difference
between the original estimate for the facilities and the ultimate cost. However, the two sides finally came
to an agreement as to how to cover the extra expenditures. See id. at 363-65.
215 Id. at 364. This sum mitigated the future rental payments that the Indians will pay in the
future.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 360-65. The "sin tax," applied to alcohol and cigarettes, is expected to gross $169.5
million over the life of the agreement.
218 Id. at 364.
219 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 37.
=D Id.
221 Id. These ticket thresholds apply to both basketball and non-basketball events.
Austrian & Rosentraub, supra note 212, at 364.
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cents per ticket sold after 1.85 million paid admissions, one dollar between
2.25 and 2.5 million attendance, and $1.25 per ticket for attendance above 2.5
million 22 The present value of this ticket revenue is $63.5 million for the
city.224 These creative solutions to covering the excess expenditures ensure
that the city will not lose money on the investment. Just as the city benefits,
so do the two sports teams. Both the Indians and the Cavaliers will receive
the revenue from all parking, signage, concessions, and luxury and seat
revenues." This revenue help increase each teams' profitability and the
value of their respective franchise.
3. CLEVELAND'S DOWNTOWN REVITALIZATION
Beyond the mutual benefits reaped by both the city and the Indians and
Cavaliers as detailed above, perhaps the most significant benefit realized is
the revitalization of Cleveland's downtown area. The two new sports
facilities are complemented with other development projects: a theater
district, large corporate headquarters, two shopping malls, numerous
restaurants and clubs, a museum district, and several apartment and
condominium complexes. 226 These various attractions draw large number
of crowds to a once desolate downtown.
In fact, the excitement created by this rejuvenated downtown area has
actually translated into tangible economic benefits. From 1992-1995, there
was a net increase in the number of businesses established in the downtown
area. 227 During 1996 alone, an additional thirteen restaurants were opened,
occupying one hundred thousand square feet in the Gateway area.2 8 These
business have also created new jobs. Within the three years after
construction was initiated on the two sports facilities, the downtown area
created 1,251 new jobs, in addition to the 1,779 jobs that had been created
prior to the building of the two facilities.2-
Since 1991, in addition to the two new sports facilities, more than $700
million has been spent on other major development projects downtown.
Cleveland also ensured that its redevelopment goals would be realized by also
improving the downtown area's infrastructure: streets, sidewalks, lighting,
3 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 1, at 32, 36.
=4 Austrian & Rosentraub, supra note 212, at 365.
=5 Id.
6 Id. at 356-57.
Id. at 379.
M Id. at 380. Most of these restaurants are a direct result ofJacobs Field and Gund Arena.
-19 Id. at 379.
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landscaping, and signage.' This holistic approach to downtown redevelop-
ment has lead to great economic success for the city and local businesses.
VII. Los ANGELES' STAPLES CENTER
A. Introduction
On October 31, 1997, the Los Angeles City Council approved the
Disposition and Development Agreement ("DDA") between the L.A. Arena
Development Company, LLC ("Developer"), and the City of Los Angeles
("City") to build a new sports arena in downtown Los Angeles, later named
the Staples Center." The agreement to build the Staples Center, which
opened in October 1999 at a cost of approximately $375 million, marked the
culmination of more than two years of planning and negotiation between the
Developer and the City. With this agreement, the City lured the NBA's Los
Angeles Lakers and the NHL's Los Angeles Kings from their former home
at the Great Western Forum in Inglewood, California, to the new location
within City limits. 2  In approving this deal, which committed public funds
to the construction of the Staples Center, the City hoped to revitalize the
South Park neighborhood of downtown Los Angeles by spurring economic
investment, development, and growth in the area. Moreover, in stark
contrast to the Motion of Understanding ("MOU") entered into by both
parties nearly ten months earlier, the DDA embodied a financially favorable
deal for the City, particularly in light of the objective standards by which
such agreements are judged. In fact, given the absence of financial risk
associated with the investment, coupled with the potential for significant
economic gains, the City set a new standard for new sports facility financing
deals which offered important, substantive benefits to both parties.
230 Id. at 380.
231 Disposition and Development Agreement By and Between the City of Los Angeles and the
L.A. Arena Development Company, LLC (Oct. 31, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafterDisposition and
DevelopmnentAgreetnent]. I will refer to the new sports arena as the Staples Center when speaking about the
facility both before and after its naming for consistency and clarity.
23. See id. at S 16.1 (a) (stating that the Lakers and Kings will "play Substantially All Home Games
at an arena to be constructed by the Developer for a period of 25 years following construction thereof...").
The NBA's Los Angeles Clippers later signed a six year lease to play their home games in the new arena
as well. Steve Springer, Clippers to Join Kings, Lakers in New Arena: Donald Sterling's NBA Team Agrees to a
Six-Year Pact to Play in the Downtown Staples Center When It Opens Next Year, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1998,
at B1.
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B. Revitalizing Downtovn Los Angeles: A New Sports Arena
1. THE SOUTH PARKAREA OF DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES
The South Park neighborhood which hosts the Staples Center, "[was]
blighted and in need of economic revitalization." 23 The seventy block area
of downtown Los Angeles was marked by empty parking lots, boarded-up
warehouses, and "For Lease" signs which adorned most office buildings in
the neighborhood.' Twenty-five percent of this area, which one local
reporter described as "predominantly sleepy and often seedy," was comprised
of parking lots, while another 25% of the land remained vacant and
undeveloped."3 Moreover, although 90% of the 270 apartments were rented,
much of the ground retail space was empty. 6 Given these dilapidated
conditions in South Park, City officials sought to revitalize the area.
2. SPURRING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
City officials saw the opportunity to revitalize this area of downtown Los
Angeles with the Staples Center, which hosts basketball and hockey games,
as well as concerts and other events. Onjanuary 15,1997, the City Council,
with a thirteen to two vote, entered into an initial agreement with the
Developer to construct this new facility. The City Council defended this
action by pointing to its governmental duty to encourage economic
development of this kind.2  This commitment to revitalizing downtown Los
2 Los Angeles Arena Motion of Understanding By and Between the City of Los Angeles and the
LA Arena Development Company Uan. 15, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Los Angeles Arena
Motion of Understanding].
2 Larry Gordon,Hopes and Goals Downto"wn: Merchants Say Proposed SportsArena Next to Convention
Center Would Bring an Econotnit Boon, But Some Critics Wonder How Much It Would He4 the Depressed Area,
LA TIMES, Sept. 2, 1996, at B1.
23 Jesus Sanchez, California: News and Insight on Business in the Golden State Heard on the Beat/Real
Estate Courting Change Sports Arena Raises Hopefor Revitalizing Dmontown's South Side, LA TIMES, Apr. 30,
1998, at D2; see also Gordon, supra note 234, at B1.
M6 Gordon, supra note 234, at B1. The population ofSouth Park was only one third ofthe 15,000
called for in city plans. City officials anticipate an increase in population with the projected economic
boon that the new sports arena will spur.
P See Disposition and Developnent Agreenent, supra note 231, at S 1.10 (stating that encouraging
economic development that creates or retains jobs and income for the City "[i]s a valid and important
public and municipal purpose"); Development Agreement By and Between the City of Los Angeles and
the LA Arena Development Company, LLC (Oct. 23,1997) (draft date) (on file with author) [hereinafter
DevelopmentAgreenent], at S 2.1 (citing the State Enabling Statute, S 65864, which authorizes cities to enter
to enter into binding development agreements with private parties).
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Angeles was explicitly stated in the DDA, which detailed both the City's and
Developer's goal of eliminating blight in and redeveloping the South Park
area "in a manner that will encourage redevelopment in surrounding areas"
as well.'
Proponents of the Staples Center, from City officials to local business
leaders, envisioned that the arena would be ap important first phase in the
development of the downtown area into a hive of sports and entertainment
related shops and restaurants.239 By attracting more visitors to the downtown
area, the Staples Center and subsequent development projects will generate
increased economic activity that will hopefully revive the impoverished,
stagnant neighborhood. These other development projects will include
"Hotel, Retail, Dining and Entertainment facilities in the vicinity of the
Arena." 24° These developments will be designed to enhance the pedestrian
environment, by establishing retail and other active space fronting Figueroa
Street and linking to other areas north and south along the street.241
A key to the success of the downtown redevelopment plan will be the use
and expansion of the currently underbooked and heavily subsidized Los
Angeles Convention Center. The agreement between the City and the
Developer explicitly calls for the identification of and development of shared
use opportunities between the Convention Center and the Staples Center.242
These "shared use" opportunities, City officials anticipate, will bring more
events to the Convention Center, which will subsequently bring new income
to the City and defray the cost of the Convention Center. To accommodate
this projected new business, the Convention Center will need to expand.
The agreement between the City and the Developer calls for a 250,000
square foot expansion, bringing the Convention Center's usable space to
1,000,000 total square feet.24 3 As stated in the agreement, the Convention
Center and its expansion is of "vital importance" to the "success and vitality
of the downtown area." 2'
The building of the Staples Center, the expansion of the Convention
Center, and the other development projects will create what developers and
M Disposition and Development Agreement, supra note 231, atS 1. 11.
2" Jean Merl, Council Endorses Deal to Build Sports Arena Downtou: Lopsided Vote Commits City
Funds and Land to Projets. Wads and Holden Criticize Move, LA. TIMES, Jan. 16,1997, at B1.
240 Disposition and DevopinentAgremnent,supra note 231, at S 1.8. These development projects, the
City anticipates, will create new jobs n the City and contribute additional spending and output to the
City's economy. See id., at SS 3.1, 3.2.
241 Id.
'42 Id. at S 8.7.
'43 Los Angel esArena Motion of Understanding, supra note 233, at S 7.16.
244 Id.
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designers call a "Times Square West."2" The thirty-five acre district
surrounding the Staples Center will have hotels, movie theaters, theme
restaurants, and a sports museum.246 Electronic billboards, video screens in
the sidewalks, ice skating rinks, and even a tower like that in New York on
which a glittery globe could descend at midnight on New Year's Eve are
being considered as further entertainment attractions.247  This new
entertainment mecca in Los Angeles will compete with local municipalities
such as Santa Monica, Pasadena, and Universal City which also boast highly
lucrative entertainment, shopping, and tourist centers. 24' This vision for
downtown revitalization depends, in large part, upon the success of the
Staples Center.
3. DESIGN OF THE NEW SPORTS ARENA
With the Staples Center being the cornerstone of this downtown
revitalization project, the City and the Developer took great care in planning
the schematics and design of the facility. The two parties planned "a first
class, state-of-the-art sports and entertainment facility for the exhibition of
professional hockey and basketball, concerts and other events...., 249 The
Staples Center has approximately 20,000 seats when configured for
basketball, 160 luxury suites, 2,476 club seats, and 750,000 square feet of
gross area .2' Also, the Staples Center houses approximately 100,000 square
feet of ancillary retail, dining, and entertainment facilities, 50,000 square feet
of office space for administrative use by the Developer and the professional
sports teams, a practice basketball facility, and other such facilities.251' The
agreement between the Developer and the City stipulates that the design of
the Staples Center would be "architecturally compatible with and which
complements the facade of the Convention Center."252 This architectural
coherence and continuance lends itself to the overall downtown
redevelopment plan detailed above. Moreover, as will be discussed infra, the
245 Larry Gordon, SportsArena Previews Unveiled Downtown: Conceptual Looks Stress Hip Times Square
Ambiance of Hotels, Theaters, and Restaurants, LA TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1997, at B1.
246 Id.
247 Id.
,48 Gordon, supra note 234, at BI.
249 Disposition and Development Agreement, supra note 231, at S 1.5.
"o Id. See also David Wharton, Staples Center Will Contain Many Perks for Upscale Clientele that is
Unique to Los Angeles, LA TIMES,June 27, 1999, at D1.
251 Los Angeles Arena Motion of Understanding, supra note 233, at SS 8.2(c)(i)-(iv). The agreement
further allows for uses of the facility consistent with that of other sports arenas and for all other lawful
purposes permitted by law other than adult entertainment businesses.
2 Id. at S 4.5.1.
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design of the Staples Center allows for the mutual maximization of economic
benefits for the City and the Developer.
C. Costs and Responsibilities
1. INTRODUCTION
This section will discuss the responsibilities and general costs associated
with the project and to whom they are delegated within the agreement. The
actual costs and exact details of the financial deal will be fleshed out in
sections D and E, which analyze the MOU and the DDA respectively. The
following two sections, instead, explain which party is responsible for the
different processes necessary to bring the project to fruition.
2. FOR THE DEVELOPER
The Developer was responsible for the construction of the Staples
Center. The agreement between the parties stipulated that the Developer
"shall at its sole cost and expense (except as otherwise provided in the DDA)
develop and construct the arena ... . This general overarching
responsibility divided itself into areas such as the development, planning,
design, construction, and operation of the project. The Developer's
responsibility began with the demolition of existing structures on the Staples
Center site.2 4 This event coincided with another important undertaking for
which the Developer was responsible: the environmental investigation and
remediation with respect to hazardous substances that were introduced at the
Staples Center site.255 In conjunction with the construction of the Staples
Center, the Developer also met all of the permit and development conditions
imposed by city and state laws, rules, and ordinances.2 6 Moreover, the actual
construction of the arena begot other responsibilities such as the costs of
project and project-related signage, on-site and off-site costs related to
construction, utility relocation, the mitigation required by the Environmental
Impact Report, and the use and costs of private consultants.2 7 Once the
Staples Center was constructed, the Developer remained responsible for the
M Arena Ground Lease By and Between the City ofLosAngeles and the L.A. Arena Development
Company, LLC (Oct. 13, 1997) (draft date) (on file with author). For details of the financial contribution
of the City, see infra text accompanying notes 260-66.
2 Rick Orlov, Razing ofArena Site OK'D, L.A. DAiLY NEwS,Jan. 21, 1998, at N3.
2 LosAngelesArena Motion of Understanding, supra note 233, at S 8.2.2.
2 Id. at S 5.1.2.
257 Id.
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maintenance, improvements, and repairs to the facility.258 Finally, the
Developer was responsible for cooperatingwith any defense against litigation
in regard to the Staples Center. s9 Most of these responsibilities are
customarily the obligations of the developer or owner in new sports facility
agreements.
3. FOR THE CITY
The City's responsibilities came in two forms: financial and
governmental. The City provided public money to the construction of the
new arena and also performed some proprietary and governmental roles in
the process.26° In terms of preparing the site for construction, the City
oversaw all residential relocations and the relocation of the Los Angelitos
Children's Center.26' Next, related to the actual building of the facility, the
City did " everything legally within its powers to further the project."262 This
type of assistance included aiding the Developer in attaining various
entitlements, easements, and other approvals. These City obligations
paralleled those taken by other cities in similar new sports facility
agreements.
D. The MOU: The Original, Less Favorable Agreement
The Developer and the City entered into an initial agreement - theMOU -to build the $200 million arena on January 15, 1997.263 The City
initially pledged $70.5 million in public funds to the project .2' The yearly
debt service on this financial commitment would have been $6.8 million. 65
Over the twenty-seven year period the deal, the City's costs, with interest,
58 Disposition and Development Agreement, supra note 231, at S 11.2.
259 Id. at S 17.6. In fact, this stipulation called for the Developer to advance and reimburse the
City for all reasonable costs incurred in defending the litigation.
260 Jean Merl, Sports Arena Plan Approved by City Panel Development: Council Could Vote on
Controversial Project as Soon as Wednesday. Revenues Are Expected - But Not Guaranteed, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14,
1997, at B3.
261 Los Angeles Arena Motion of Understanding, supra note 233, at S 5.2.2.
26 Id. at S 2.1.
2 Merl, supra note 239, at B 1.
264 Id. Of the $70.5 million, $63 million was earmarked to acquire and prepare the arena site, and
$7.5 million was set aside for the residential relocation, relocation of the Los Angelitos Children's Center,
and administrative costs.
265 Rick Henderson, Here's a Deal We Can Afford to Refuse Sports Arena: Public Money Shouldn't Be
Spent on Fat Cats Who Expect Huge Profits, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1997, at B7.
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would have been $180 million.2 6 Moreover, the City agreed to lease the site
of the Staples Center for one dollar a year and donate other properties
necessary for the project to the Developer.267
Under the MOU, all of the tax flows from the project were earmarked
for the repayment of the City's debt.26s The tax revenue would have come
from a variety of different sources: admissions fee, City parking tax, and
construction sales tax. The agreement provided for the City to charge
admissions fees for a period of twenty-five years. The City could assess a
ticket tax designed to produce $3.5 million per year in revenue.269 If the
yearly estimated rate produced a deficit or a surplus, the MOU provided for
an estimate for the next year to bring the yearly average to the designated $3.5
million amount.270 Another provision ensured that if the particular
admissions fee arrangement detailed in the MOU were invalidated by a court
order, the City would be allowed to impose an alternative admissions or
entertainment tax on its patrons.27' If this tax or fee were subsequently
invalidated, the Developer promised to reimburse the City $1.75 million for
lost anticipated revenue from an admissions fee.172 However, this promise
was not guaranteed by a third party. The City would also have collected
revenue from parking taxes imposed on all parking facilities servicing and
located near the Staples Center.273 Likewise, the City would receive 100% of
the construction sales tax.274 These sources of projected-generated tax
revenue, the City anticipated, would cover the $136.5 million risk facing the
City in regard to its debt service. 75
The City would also receive additional benefits from the creations of
new jobs. A study commissioned by the Los Angeles Convention and
Visitors Bureau projected that arena project would create 710 permanent
jobs, plus 514jobs indirectly dependent on arena activities.7 6 However, the
266 OFFICE OF COUNCILMAN JOEL WACHS, COMPARISON OF NEW PROPOSAL TO EXISTING
MOU DEAL AND THE DEVELOPER'S AUGUST 1997 'GUARANT? PROPOSAL 1 (Oct. 8,1997) [hereinafter
Comparison of New Proposal].
M7 Id.
208 Id.
- Los Angeles Arena Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 233, at S 12.1.1.
I-t d. at S 12.1.2.
271 Id.
" Id. at S 12.1.6. This promise constituted the only guarantee offered by the Developer in the
MOU.I" Id. at S 9.8.
4 Comparison of New Proposal, supra note 267, at 1.
75 Merl, supra note 239, at B 1. As aforementioned, the City's yearly debt service would have been
$6.8 million. With the $1.75 million "guarantee" from the Developer, the yearly City risk would be $5.05
million. Over a twenty-five year period, the total City risk would equal $136.5 million.
276 Gordon, supra note 234, at B1. The authors of this study, EY Kenneth Leventhal Real Estate
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Developer did not commit to any job-incentive programs. The Developer
promised, however, to employ women and minorities in at least 25% of
arena-related jobs.277
The MOU deal mirrored many agreements between other professional
sports teams and their respective host cities. First, the City would have
donated millions of dollars worth of property to the Developer without
compensation. Further, like most of other cities entering into such
agreements, the City would have been faced with much financial uncertainty
in regard to debt service payments and projected tax revenue. Although the
City hoped that the new tax revenue would cover its debt service, without a
significant guarantee from the Developer, an invalidated admissions fee or
less revenue than projected would have left the City with up to $5.05 million
in yearly debt. Moreover, the new tax revenue created by the Staples Center
would have been wholly earmarked for repaying the debt service. In this
regard, the City's investment would not have returned any additional
revenue from the project to the City. The City's only tangible benefits
would have been the potential to revitalize downtown and the creation of
more than a thousand potential new jobs. However, this uncertainty,
coupled with the potential for millions of dollars worth of debt a year, made
this a financially undesirable deal for the City.
E. The DDA: Setting a New Standard
1. BACKGROUND
After the City Council approved the MOU, the City and the Developer
entered into nine months of negotiations to finalize an agreement to build
the Staples Center. CouncilmanJoel Wachs, a critic of the agreement under
the MOU, called for a public discussion regarding the Staples Center to gain
leverage in seeking a better financial deal with the Developer. 8 The City
Council subsequently made public certain aspects of the agreement.279 The
public responded negatively to the MOU, which provided few financial
benefits to the City. The City, in turn, used this public sentiment to
negotiate more favorable terms for the final agreement. The result was the
Group, acknowledged that these figures may have also included many jobs already in existence at the
Great Western Forum in Inglewood. Moreover, the authors conceded that many of these jobs, like cotton
candy vendors, would be near minimum wage.
m Merl, supra note 239, at B1.
M Ted Rohrlich, Waths Stiffens Proposalfor Vote on Arena, LA TIMES, Sept. 12,1997, at B3.
I7 Jodi Wilgoren,Arena Builders Ready to Offer Debt Guarantee: Developers Promise to Pick Up Tab for
$70 Million in City Bonds, Sources Say, LA TIMEs, Aug. 22, 1997, at Al.
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DDA, which provided a more favorable financial deal for the City than the
MOU had provided. The more favorable provisions in the DDA arose in a
decrease in the City's contribution, an increase in revenues and benefits for
the City, and a guarantee from the Developer which ensured that the City
will, at the very least, receive enough revenue to meet its yearly debt service.
The DDA, therefore, resulted in a model sports facility financial agreement
which provides the Developer with significant benefits while offering the
City the potential for financial gains without any risk of debt - a situation
unmatched by other sports facility financial deals.
2. THE CITY'S FINANCIAL OBLIGATION
Under the new agreement, the City still pledged public funds to the
project. This financial contribution was used to acquire and prepare the
Staples Center site, to pay for all residential relocations, and to relocate the
Los Angelitos Children's Center.280 However, while the MOU called for a
City financial contribution totaling $70.5 million, the DDA reduced the
borrowed funds advanced by the City to $58.5 million. 28 ' The City's yearly
debt service payment subsequently decreased from $6.8 million to $4.9
million.28 2 Therefore, the DDA reduced both the City's yearly and total
financial obligation.
3. THE CITY'S REVENUE SOURCES
As detailed by the "Development Agreement" between the City and the
Developer, the City receives revenue from many of the same sources as
under the MOU: admissions fee, parking revenues, and revenues directly
and indirectly garnered from property taxes, sales taxes, business license
taxes, utility taxes, and taxes attributable to arena-related business activities.
283
However, unlike the MOU, the DDA allocates all of the revenue from these
280 Disposition and Development Agreenent, supra note 231, at S 3.2().
281 Gap Funding Agreement By and Between the City of Los Angeles and L.A. Arena
Development Company, LLC (Oct. 13, 1997) (draft date) (on file with author) [hereinafter Gap Funding
Agreement].
M2 Comparison of New Proposal, supra note 267, at 1.
2 Disposition and DevelopmentAgreenent, supra note 231, at S 3.1.3.3. The City also receives a net
annual rent of one dollar payable in advance and prepaid for the entire term of the agreement for the lease
on the arena site. Arena Ground Lease, supra note 253, at S 6.1. Similar to the MOU, the DDA provides
for an admissions fee assessed to arena ticket sales at a rate to average $3.5 million for a twenty-five year
period. Disposition and Development Agrmnent, supra note 231, at SS 3.3.1-3.3.3.
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taxes to the City.2s4 Moreover, revenue from property, parking, business
licenses, sales, and utility taxes are not used to repay the City's debt service.85
This revenue, instead, constitutes new revenue from the City for whatever
use City officials see fit. A conservative estimate of this revenue totals a $73.6
million value to the City over the twenty-five year life of the agreement.286
The City, therefore, is guaranteed a tangible financial return on its invest-
ment.
Two other additional revenue sources, not included in the MOU, also
make the deal more favorable to the City. First, the Los Angeles Community
Redevelopment Agency agreed to contribute $12 million to the project for
the cost of certain public improvements.- This amount lessened the City's
contribution to the Staples Center from $70.5 million to $58.5 million.
Second, the DDA requires the Developer to purchase the City-owned
Olympic properties necessary for the development project. The MOU had
provided for the transference of these properties from the City to the
Developer without any compensation, as is custom in most sport facility
financial deals. 88 Under the DDA, however, the Developer paid the City
$4.8 million - the actual cost to acquire these properties.289 This revenue,
unaccounted for in terms of being a cost or benefit in the MOU, added to
the money gained by the City in excess of its debt service payments.
4. JOB INCENTIVE PROGRAM
Another benefit claimed by the City in the DDA is a concrete
commitment on the part of the Developer to implement a job incentive
program like that used by DreamWorks SKG in their agreement with the
City and the State of California.2' This program has created an estimated
eight hundred new jobs directly related to the Staples Center.29' The
quantifiable value for the City ofthisjob incentive program is approximately
2M Comparison of New Proposal, supra note 266, at 1. Under the DDA, the Developer gives up all
claims to anticipated tax receipts.
2s Id.
2M Id.
8 Id. This contribution was consistent with the Community Redevelopment Agency's mission
to redevelop blighted areas. As S 1.6 of the DDA points out, the Community Development Agency "[i]s
a public body, corporate and politic, formed and existing under Chapter 2 of the Community
Redevelopment Law of the State of California."
N See text accompanying supra note 140.
289 Comparison of New Proposal, supra note 266, at 1.
M Id. at 2.
291 Id.
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$2.7 million.292 In addition, further job creation is expected through the
aforementioned development projects related to the Staples Center.
The DDA also provides for training and other opportunity-producing
programs for local residents. As the DDA states, the City and the Developer
are "committed to extending to residents of the City of Los Angeles the
employment and economic opportunities expected to result from the
development and operation of the Project." 3  Under the terms of the
agreement, the Developer implemented a voluntary minority and women
business enterprise program and workforce utilization program.294 Finally,
in terms of all construction jobs related to the Staples Center, the Developer
paid and ensured that all sub-contractors paid "prevailing wages" as
determined pursuant to the provisions of Section 1770 of the California
Labor Code.29 These additional provisions benefited the City because of the
significant opportunities they provided local residents.
5. GAP FUNDING AGREEMENT
The crown jewel of the DDA, however, is the Developer's personal
guarantee that loans of any City funds will be repaid for the Staples Center.
If the admissions fees plus incremental parking revenue does not repay the
City's yearly debt service, the Developer will repay the difference.296 This
unqualified, unconditional promise to pay any remaining debt attributable
to the City is backed by an irrevocable letter of credit issued by a financial
institution with a net worth of more than one billion dollars.297  This
agreement protects the City from any financial losses by reducing the City's
debt service to zero. This inimitable provision in the DDA alleviates any
financial risk for the City, while at the same time providing the City with the
opportunity to reap financial benefits if the Staples Center is successful.
- Id.
-9 Disposition and DevdopinentAgreemnent, supra note 231, at S 13.2. In particular, the City and the
Developer will target the three mile radius around the arena site in providing such opportunities to
residents of the City.
Id. at S 9.11. The purpose of this program is to assist local minority-owned businesses and
women-owned businesses in participating in the economic opportunities associated with the development
and operation of the arena, both on-site and off-site. Moreover, the Developer will work with the City's
Community Development Department in the Entrepreneurial Program and its Business Assistance
Center Program in furthering these goals. Id. at S 13.2(a).
Id. at S 9.12.
-9 A Summary of Development Across Los Angeles County Community: Los Angeles City Council OKs
Final Details of Sports Arena, LA TIMES, Mar. 21, 1998, at B2.
N7 Gap Funding Agreement, supra note 281, at S 3.9(a)(i).
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6. THE DEVELOPER'S BENEFITS
While the DDA provided significant benefits for the City, it did not do
so to the detriment of the Developer. With as economically sound a financial
agreement as the City negotiated, the Developer receives equally beneficial,
if not better, provisions. The DDA granted the naming rights of the facility
to the Developer, who signed a twenty year, $116 million agreement with
Staples, Inc., to name the Staples Center.28 Also, the Developer receives the
revenue from the sale of the 160 luxury suites, leased at prices ranging from
$197,000 to $307,5000 a year; the 2,476 club seats, starting at $12,995; and
other ticket sales, including memberships to the Grand Reserve Club - a
private restaurant and lounge - with a yearly fee of $10,500.299  The
Developer also entered into sponsorship deals with ten corporations, each
paying approximately $2 to $3 million a year, for rights to display
advertisements.300 Parking revenues for the Developer garner approximately
$9.6 million per year.3"' Finally, the Developer generates revenue from
various commercial licensing agreements. These revenue sources will
substantially increase the profits of the teams and will subsequently increase
the values of the respective franchises. For example, the Staples Center
increased the value of the Los Angeles Lakers by approximately $100
million.'
F. 4y the Staples Center is Economicaly Justiiable
1. THE DDA IMPROVES THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT IN THE MOU
The financial agreement originally set out in the MOU was similar to
most new sports facility deals around the country. The provisions of the
MOU were more favorable than the deals in Hartford and St. Louis because
the City would not have had to pay for the construction of the entire stadium
and would have received reasonable amounts of revenue to cover at least part
29 Westhead, supra note 98, at B9.
S Disposition and DevelopmentAgreetnent, supra note 231, at S1.5. There were no luxury suites in
the Kings' and Lakers' former home, the Great Western Forum. The Clippers gain revenue from the two
luxury suites in their former facility, the Los Angeles Memorial Sports Arena. See also Wharton, supra note
250, at D1.
3o A Year and a HafAfter Groundbreaking, a Sports Palace Emerges in the Heart of Downtown, L.A.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 10, 1999, at 48.
301 Id.
3 Steve Springer and Larry Stewart, LA.'s Leading Man, LA TIMESJune 15, 2001, at D1.
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of its debt payment. However, applying the objective standards as set out in
Part IV of this Article, the MOU was not an economically justifiable
investment for the City. First, although the City devoted a smaller
percentage and a smaller total contribution to the Staples Center compared
to many others such deals, there was uncertainty as to whether the taxes
would cover the City's debt payment. Moreover, all of the tax revenue
earmarked for the City would have been used to pay off the City's debt on
the Staples Center. If these sources of tax revenue failed to meet the yearly
debt payment, the City would have had to supplement their payment
through money taken from the City's general fund. This amount had the
potential to be as expensive as $5.05 million per year. Second, as is the case
with most new sports facility agreements, the City was not receiving any
form of compensation for the properties transferred to the Developer for
construction purposes. These properties are worth approximately $4.8
million dollars., Finally, the MOU provided no meaningful or substantive
guarantees for substantial revenue sources nor ajob incentive program which
sought to aid the residents of the local community. All of these
considerations could have cost the City more than $185 million.30 3
The DDA, in contrast, provided the City with what Councilman Joel
Wachs called "the best arena proposal ever negotiated in the United
States."304 Many different aspects of the agreement made this deal a good
investment for the City. First, the City's contribution to the Staples Center,
$58.5 million, is proportionally one of the lowest amounts ever given to a
private developer from a city. Second, the City repays its already small yearly
debt service payment, $4.9 million, through revenue from admissions and
incremental parking taxes. If these two sources of revenue do not cover this
yearly amount, the Developer will pay the difference with its own funds.
This guarantee reduces the City's debt service to zero and alleviates any
financial risk for the City. This provision also ensures that the Staples
Center will pay for itself. The value to the City of this provision alone is
approximately $62.9 million. Third, the City also garners revenue from
other sources such as property taxes, sales taxes, business license taxes, utility
taxes, and taxes attributable to arena-related business activities. The City
does not use this revenue to repay its debt service, but rather use these excess
funds for whatever purpose it deems necessary. This revenue, which will
span a twenty-five year period, embodies a return on the City's investment
in the Staples Center - something nearly no other new sports facility deal can
boast. As Keith Comrie, the City's former Chief Administrative Officer,
JOEL WACHS, STATEMENT OF COUNCILMAN JOEL WACHS, RE: PROPOSED DOWNTOWN
ARENA, 1 (Oct. 7, 1997).
Id.
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confidently boasted: "[T]he city will make a profit off [the Staples
Center]."3° The conservative estimate for the value of this provision is $73.6
million. Fourth, the City received from the Developer the actual worth of
the properties used in the Staples Center development: $4.8 million. This
provision in the agreement is rare in such financial plans. Finally, the jobs
incentive program provides jobs for local residents - a $2.7 million value for
the City. These new provisions save the City more than $126 million from
the agreement set forth in the MOU. 3 6 Moreover, these facets of the
agreement, many of them unique to new sports facility financial plans,
provide a stark contrast to the traditional model for such deals, which often
put tremendous financial demands on cities without room for much
potential benefit.
2. PROVIDING A GOOD INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY
The Staples Center also provides a good investment opportunity for the
City in light of some of the criteria set out in Part IV. First, since Los
Angeles lured the Lakers and Kings away from Inglewood, most, if not all, of
thejobs and the spectator spending in the downtown area will constitute new
net income for the City.3 7 While many of the jobs created will be ones
currently in existence in Inglewood, they will now be within City limits and,
per the jobs incentive program, will be targeted for local Los Angeles
residents. These will be "new" jobs for the City. Also, the spending
associated with arena-related events will shift from Inglewood and its
businesses to downtown Los Angeles and its businesses. Therefore, this
spending, for the most part, will constitute new net spending in the City, not
just displacement entertainment revenue as many critics point out most
financial plans incorrectly attribute to the new sports arena or stadium."
305 A Summary of Development Across Los Angeles County Community: Los Angeles City Council OKs
Final Details of Sports Arena, supra note 296, at B2.
306 Comparison of New Proposal, supra note 266, at 2.
307 This fact does not imply that all successful new sports facilities are the product of a zero-sum
game. The economic benefits that one city receives are not merely the ones lost by another municipality.
In the Staples Center example, Los Angeles is not benefiting solely at the cost of Inglewood. Los Angeles'
long-term vision for the South Park neighborhood includes additional economic growth spurred by the
new arena, which is in addition to thejobs and spectator spending diverted from Inglewood. Moreover,
successful new sports arenas and stadiums can arise where a municipality is granted an expansion
franchise, rather than hosting a team that left its former city.
sV8 See text accompanying supra notes 150-52. This spending in the redeveloped downtown area
would still be considered new net income to the City if it were displacement entertainment spending
because the main entertainment locales in the Southern California area - Pasadena, Universal City, and
Santa Monica - are all outside City limits. Therefore, the subsequent tax revenue andjob creation created
by this spending would be considered "new" benefits to the City.
2002]
542 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 10:483
Second, related to this first point, the Los Angeles plan for redeveloping
its downtown area mirrors those successful revitalization efforts in Cleveland
and Baltimore.3' The City has taken a holistic approach as these other cities
did. The redevelopment plan focuses on building around the Staples
Center.310 Hotels, restaurants, and other retail and entertainment businesses
will eventually accompany the Staples Center. In fact, on September 5,2001,
the Los Angeles City Council approved the second phase of development
around the Staples Center.3 ' Moreover, the City recently renovated the
Convention Center, which will also draw events and thus new business to
the downtown area. Also, other major development projects not related to
the Staples Center, but considered as part of the larger plan to redevelop
downtown Los Angeles, will likely attract tourists and people outside of the
City to the area. Three development projects - the new Catholic Cathedral,
the Disney Hall concert center, and the potential refurbishing of the Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum in anticipation of attracting a new NFL
franchise - will help provide other attractions, as Cleveland and Baltimore
offered, to draw a new influx of people to the downtown area.
Finally, the Staples Center meets the occupancy rate and diversified
entertainment and activity base that are usually related to successful new
sports facilities." 2 As aforementioned, new sports facilities which host
hockey and basketball games are more successful than football stadiums
because of the greater number of regular season games, between the two
sports, which occur each year. The frequency of these games draws more
people to the downtown area, increasing spending and tax revenue in the
targeted redevelopment area. In fact, Staples Center hosts approximately 280
events per year.313
3M See text accompanying supra notes 203-30.
310 The Staples Center has already received to awards for helping to revitalize the South Park area
of downtown Los Angeles. The arena received the 2001 Skyline Award which is awarded to efforts that
preserve, develop or better utilize "the land resources of the Los Angeles metropolitan area." Staples Center
Honoredfor Revitalizing Efforts, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at C9. The Downtown Breakfast Club, which
annually ranks the best and worst downtown Los Angeles real estate, honored Staples Center with a
special award for its revitalization efforts. Breakfast Club Honors Library, Staples Center, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
25, 2000, at C13.
311 Los Angeles Staples Center Area Rezoned to Further Builders' Grand Plan Development, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 2001, at B3. Noting the economic benefits to both the City, the developers, and the local
community, Councilmember Eric Garcetti stated, "[tihis agreement really begins to chip away at the idea
that economic prosperity and social justice cannot go hand in hand... [w]e showed today that we can
put those together."
312 See text accompanying supra notes 131-32.
313 Jesus Sanchez and Matea Gold, Site for Proposed Stadium in Limbo, L. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2002,
at B1.
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Another factor that relates to this notion is the diversification of the
entertainment and activity offered at a new sports facility. The more
successful sport facilities, as previously detailed, are those which have the
capacity to draw alternative, supplemental events such as concerts, political
conventions, trade shows, and the like. These types of events, like the
regular season games, draw tourists and fans to the downtown area at
different times of the year. This continuity of sporting events and other
attractions provides an incentive for businesses to relocate or originate in the
downtown area - another key to such revitalization efforts. The Staples
Center in downtown Los Angeles embodies these characteristics. First, the
Staples Center hosts the Lakers, Clippers, and Kings. Therefore, the Staples
Center will have three teams' regular season home games from November
through May. The arena also hosts the WNBA's Los Angeles Sparks and the
Arena Football League's Los Angeles Avengers during the summertime.
Most sports arenas of similar size host either one or two major league sports
teams. Moreover, because of its configuration and location, the Staples
Center draws concerts, political conventions, trade shows, and other types
of supplemental entertainment events.314 For example, the Staples Center
hosted the 2000 Democratic National Convention, the Pacific 10
Tournament, the NHL All-Star Game, the U.S. Figure Skating
Championships, the Powerade Indoor Games (formerly the L.A. Indoor
Track and Field Championships), the 2000 Grammy Awards, boxing events
such as Oscar de la Hoya vs. Shane Mosley, and multiple concerts. These
attributes further increase the Staples Center's likelihood for success in terms
of generating tax revenue for the City and helping to revitalize the downtown
area.
These different aspects of the financial plan demonstrate not only why
the City benefits from the Staples Center, but also how the deal overcomes
traditional problems, as detailed in Part V, that face cities in these deals.
First, the gap-funding agreement ensures that there will be no uncertainty in
revenue forecasts from the agreement. Whether or not the revenue from the
admissions fee and parking taxes cover the City's yearly debt service
payment, the gap funding agreement ensures that the City will meet its
financial obligation through the Developer's guarantee. Moreover, since
repayment on the City's contribution to the Staples Center is guaranteed by
314 In fact, the Staples Center is among the two finalists to host the Democratic National
Convention in 2000. Jim Newton & Robert Shogan, LA. Named Finalist for Democratic Convention:
Philadelphia's Elimination Boosts City's Chances - So Does Number of Eletoral Votes, 54, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 13,
1998, at B3. Also, in Los Angeles, most large concerts not held in stadiums are hosted at the Great
Western Forum, the former home of the Lakers and Kings. Given the new amenities of the Staples
Center, these concert events would likely be held in the new facility, rather than at the Forum.
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the Developer, the deal is truly self-financed. The Developer is paying the
majority of the Staples Center's costs, and what the City contributes will be
repaid through revenue from the admissions fee and parking taxes and/or
through the Developer's guarantee. Second, most often economic impact
reports related to new sports facilities overstate an arena's ability to attract
tourists, and thus new net spending, to the downtown area. Two points
counter this criticism when applied to the Staples Center. First, the jobs and
spectator spending were drawn from Inglewood to downtown Los Angeles,
constituting a new net economic gain for the City. Second, the City has a
large fan base on which to draw. Los Angeles County alone has a population
of more than twelve million people, 70% of which live outside City limits.
As detailed in Part V, to derive greater new net tax revenues, a city must be
able to attract fans and tourists living outside the area to the sporting and
other events at the new facility. No other NBA basketball team or NHL
hockey team plays within L.A. County besides those teams under contract to
play at the Staples Center.3 s Therefore, the fan base in both sports can
extend far outside of city limits, thus drawing new net spending to the City.
This point also refutes the common criticism of new sports facility deals that
they confuse new spending with spending diverted from other activities
within the city. Moreover, the sports teams' home games and the
supplemental entertainment activities held at the Staples Center, as
economists have pointed out, are likely to provide a continuous influx of
tourists and fans to the downtown area - a key to the City's revitalization
efforts. Therefore, by providing substantive solutions to the criticisms levied
on new sports facilities, the City has negotiated for itself an economically
justifiable financial plan in building the Staples Center.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The answer to the initial question posed at the beginning of this paper,
"Are publicly financed sports facilities economicallyjustifiable?" is "yes," but
with a realistic framework. in which to judge these types of financial deals.
Many new sports facility deals, like that in St. Louis, and that unsuccessfully
proposed Hartford, do not provide the respective host cities with sufficient
revenue to meet their financial obligations. Therefore, cities should seek to
collect, at the very least, enough revenue from the new sports facility to meet
their debt service payments and up-front expenditures. Such a deal may not
be the best possible municipal investment - on a social or economic level -
315 The NHL's Mighty Ducks play in the City of Anaheim in Orange County, but they are not
considered competitions for the Kings in terms of drawing fans from Los Angeles. The closest NBA
basketball team to Los Angeles, besides the Lakers and Clippers, is the Golden State Warriors in Oakland.
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but if a city negotiates a financial agreement that provides it with this
revenue, the deal should be considered economically justifiable. A city
should also seek to gain further economic benefits in addition to the tax
revenue raised to pay its up-front expenditures. These benefits can arise in
the form of job creation, new businesses, downtown revitalization, and
additional tax revenue gained by the city in excess of that used to repay its
debt service payments. The greater these economic benefits to the city, the
more justifiable the public financing of such sports facilities.
The Los Angeles Staples Center provides a quintessential example of
how a city can negotiate an economicallyjustifiable sports facility agreement.
The City's deal provided a reasonable up-front expenditure that it will be
able to repay through tax revenue from admissions and parking taxes and the
Developer's guarantee. The City also received fair market value for the
property used in the arena development. Moreover, the City receives
millions of dollars as a return on its investment in the form of other tax
revenue collected by the City but not used to repay its debt service. In
addition, projections for job creation and downtown revitalization look
promising. These economic benefits and lack of financial risk give the City
a deal that is not only justifiable, but should be a model for future new sports
arenas and stadiums. Unfortunately, the negotiation strategies of Los
Angeles have thus far been for naught. The unsuccessful proposed football
stadium in Hartford demonstrated that local and state governments are still
too willing to negotiate one-sided, economically detrimental new sports
facility financial deals. However, until cities follow the lead of Los Angeles
officials in negotiating favorable financial deals, or agreements which at the
very least cover the city's expenditures, local and state governments will be
at the mercy of franchises looking to obtain the best deal possible. With this
current culture pervading sports facility financing deals, cities and states will
continue to negotiate agreements that are not economicallyjustifiable for the
taxpayers or the governments.
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